The Mystique of Genetic Correctness

The Mystique of Genetic Correctness

by
Kurt Jacobsen

The democracy of Don Quixote

The democracy of Don Quixote

Novelists have always turned their hands to essays, and the essay-writing novelist remains a literary force to be reckoned with. The two forms share an inherent pluralism and scepticism that makes them natural allies of democracy

Jonathan Rée
Jonathan Rée is a freelance historian and philosopher
In or around 1605, European literature changed. No one realised it at the time, but when Don Quixote set off to save the world, a new kind of writing was born. The old forms of storytellingthe epic, the romance, the oral talewould from now on be pitted against a boisterous young rival. Before long it would be universally acknowledged that a reader hoping to enjoy a good story must be in search of a novel.

The novelty of the novel is of course connected with the rise of printing, and the growth of a literate public with time and money to spare. Beyond that, the sheer scale of the form allows storylines to be extended and multiplied as never before, crossing and re-crossing each other with ample scope for coincidence, surprise and contingency, and hence for the depiction of characters with whom, as William Hazlitt put it, the reader can “identify.” But the most momentous way in which novels distinguish themselves from other kinds of storytelling is that they give a central role to a supernumerary characterthe narratorwhose task is to transmit the story to us. All kinds of stories invite us to imagine the characters they portray, and involve ourselves in their fortunes and their follies; but to engage with novels we need to go one step further and imagine the people telling the story, or even identify with them.

The art of reading a novel involves a dash of experiment, conjecture, even risk. It requires readers to try out different narrative perspectives, styles, even personalities, and so to explore the inherent variousness of experience, and to recognise the vein of arbitrariness that runs through any possible version of events. Novels, in short, are implicitly pluralistic. In this respect they resemble essays, which, as it happens, came into existence at more or less the same time (Montaigne launched the form in 1580, with Bacon following in 1597). Essays tend to be classier, more learned and more demandingthere is no essayistic equivalent of the “popular novel”and even when written in a perfectly casual style, they are likely to be strewn with half-concealed quotations or allusions to flatter or perhaps annoy the smarter class of reader. As exercises in hesitation, exploration and experimental self-multiplication, they are like novels, only more so. You might even say that the novel aspires to the condition of the essay, and there is certainly no shortage of novelists who have aspired to be essayists too. Think of Eliot or Henry James, Woolf, Forster or Orwell, or Mann, Sartre, De Beauvoir, Camus and Mary McCarthy. And as the four recently published books now lying open on my kitchen table demonstrate, the essay-writing novelist is sill a literary force to be reckoned with.

In his luminous new collection, The Curtain (Faber & Faber), Milan Kundera argues that the special virtue of the novel lies in its ability to part the “magic curtain, woven of legends” that hangs between us and the ordinary world. The curtain has been put there to cover up the trivia of our lives, the forgotten old boxes and bags where “an enigma remains an enigma” while ugliness flirts with beauty, and reason courts the absurd. These neglected spaces were redeemed for literature, according to Kundera, at the moment when Cervantes got his readers to imagine Don Quixote as he lay dying while his niece went on eating, the housekeeper went on drinking and Sancho Panza went on being “of good cheer.” By inventing a narrator through whose consciousness such dumb events could be worked up into an affecting “scene,” Cervantes created a form of literature that could do justice to “modest sentiments”; and so a new kind of beautyKundera calls it “prosaic beauty”was born. Henry Fielding took the technique further when he created a narrator who could charm his readers with benign loquacity, and Laurence Sterne completed the development by blithely allowing the story of Tristram Shandy to be ruined by the character trying to recount it.

If Cervantes rent the curtain that separates us from the prose of ordinary life, Kafka tore it down completely. After Kafka, according to Kundera, the novel entered a realm where reality could never “correspond to people’s idea of it”; from now on the novel would be a constant witness to the “unavoidable relativism of human truths.”

Kundera suggests that no one can become a novelist who has not passed through a long night of lyrical self-absorption to emerge on the other side in a state of bewildered, uncertain enlightenment. Novelists are specialists in the kind of moral wisdom which knows “that nobody is the person he thinks he is, that this misapprehension is universal, elementary, and that it casts on people& the soft gleam of the comical.” And this gentle scepticism has political implications too, as Kundera notes when he recalls the “Manicheism” that deformed his native Czechoslovakia when he was a student in Prague after the second world war. Politics at that time was not a forum where perplexed citizens could engage in a collective search for freedom and happiness, or truth and reconciliation, but a battlefield where militant partisans would try to vindicate their correct views about everything and punish anyone who saw things differently. Kundera joined the Communist party, where he was taught that art must take sides in a historic “battle between good and evil,” but he was never quite convinced. (In 1950 he was expelled from the party for his obtuseness, but eventually gained readmission, only to be expelled a second time in 1970, after which he escaped to France and set about rebuilding his literary life in a second language.) “Art is not a village band marching dutifully at History’s heels,” Kundera now says, and politics itself will suffocate without access to the forgiving fluidity of the novel. “The novel alone,” as he puts it, “could reveal the immense, mysterious power of the pointless.”

Jm Coetzee approaches politics with a similar combination of irony, seriousness and principled reticence. His political attitudes may be connected with the difficulties of being a liberal white South African, but they have their intellectual origins in his prodigious work as a novelist. His latest collection of essays, Inner Workings (Harvill Secker), keeps returning to the question of “the novel form,” and how Cervantes created it in order to demonstrate the power of the imagination. One of the great virtues of the novel, according to Coetzee, is to teach us that there is no perfect way of carving up the world or ecounting its stories. This is a lesson that bears on politics as well, counting against any political aspiration that arises from nationality, identity or tribal loyalty.

But Coetzee does not confine his attention to novelists, and an outstanding essay on Walt Whitman allows him to explore a conception of democracy that he himself would evidently endorse: democratic politics, he suggests, is “not one of the superficial inventions of human reason but an aspect of the ever-developing human spirit, rooted in eros.” Those who make a fetish out of politics, he implies, are in danger of foreclosing on democracy. Take Walter Benjamin, for example. Coetzee, refusing to treat him with the awed indulgence that has become customary, contends that when Benjamin decided to become a good communist, it was not through an imaginative appraisal of political options, but was simply “an act of choosing sides, morally and historically, against the bourgeoisie and his own bourgeois origins.” And if there was something silly and unconvincing about Benjamin’s Marxism”something forced about it, something merely reactive”it could perhaps be attributed to a certain literary narcissism. “As a writer, Benjamin had no gift for evoking other people,” Coetzee says; he had “no talent as a storyteller,” and no capacity for the kind of compassionate intelligence implicit in the art of the novel. In a perverse attempt t
o opt for political realism rather than literary imagination, Benjamin managed to cut himself off from both.

Susan Sontag would have agreed with Coetzee about the political significance of literature. The novel, as she remarks in her last, posthumous collection At the Same Time (Hamish Hamilton), exists to recall us to a sense of the interminable diversity that is the basis of what she calls “politics, the politics of democracy.” In a substantial essay on Victor Serge, she praises him for having combined political militancy with a serious engagement with the art of writing. As a mature novelist, she says, Serge was able to deploy “several different conceptions of how to narrate,” elaborating a capacious “I” as a device for “giving voice to others.” It was through his narratorial doubles that he liberated himself from what he called the “former beautiful simplicity” of the fight between capitalism and socialism, so as to produce books that were “better, wiser, more important than the person who wrote them.”

Sontag herself never found it easy to reconcile the languorous pleasures of imaginative writing with her impulse to political plain speaking. “The wisdom of literature is quite antithetical to having opinions,” she said, and “a writer ought not to be an opinion-machine.” But she remained an irrepressible opinionator, and in At the Same Timewhich contains much that she might have revised if death had not intervenedshe sometimes lurches into monologues, adopting an unappealing tone of dogmatism, petulance, hyperbole and egocentricity. She finds it hard to talk about writers without telling us who is or is not “great” or “supremely great,” as if world literature were a competitive sport, and she the ultimate umpire. And her fury at the condition of the USshe speaks of a “culture of shamelessness,” marked by an “increasing acceptance of brutality” in which politics has been obliterated and “replaced by psychotherapy”seems to have made her forget her own better self, and her neat summation of the wisdom of the novel: the generous knowledge that whatever may be happening, “something else is always going on.”

Kundera, Coetzee and Sontag are, one feels, the kind of writers who might have steered clear of politics if they had not had it thrust upon them; but Mario Vargas Llosa has, on at least one occasion, gone out of his way to achieve political power. He won literary fame in the early 1960s and pursued a charmed career as a writer not only in his native Peru, but also in Britain, Spain and the US. But in 1990 he took a vacation fro literature in order to campaign for the presidency of Peru. He came quite close to winningsome say he would have done if his work as a novelist had not been held against himand if he had done, Peru might have enjoyed an experiment in pluralistic centre-right liberalism instead of the disastrous ten-year kleptocracy of Alberto Fujimori. After his defeat, Vargas Llosa returned with relief to his old preoccupations, and in Touchstones (Faber & Faber), his new collection of miscellaneous writings, he elaborates on the case for the political relevance of the novel.

The longest item in Touchstones is a piece of reportage rather than an essay: an account by Vargas Llosa of an extended visit to Iraq in 2003, chronicling his reluctant conversion from visceral opposition to the western invasion to firm if wary support. He was well aware that thousands of Iraqis were dying, and many coalition soldiers as well, and that the deaths were bound to continue for years; but politics is about comparisons, and he is persuaded that the death rate under the occupation is considerably lower than under the old regime. Beyond that, apart from a scary encounter with an enraged imam, he kept encountering an elated sense of freedom that was more than merely political. “As novelists know very well,” he says, “fantasies generate realities,” and in Iraq he sensed a gradual awakening from the paranoid fictions that flourish under a dictatorship.

Vargas Llosa’s optimism about Iraq may seem excessive, but it is bound up with a subtle understanding of the political responsibility of the novelist. He writes admiringly, for example, about Isak Dinesen; she claimed that she had no interest at all in “social questions,” but Vargas Llosa finds more political vitality on every page of her Gothic Tales than in any old-fashioned “literature of commitment,” which, as he puts it, “revolved maniacally around realist descriptions.” He traces the same kind of practical fertility in a vast range of 20th-century novelists, from Conrad, Mann, Woolf, Orwell and Hemingway to Henry Miller, Camus, Grass, Nabokov and Borges. A society that ignores imaginative literature, he argues, is liable to succumb to the bovine complacencies and populist idiocies of nationalism, and so to degenerate into “something like a sectarian cult.”

Vargas Llosa’s prose is sometimes slow-paced, but it speeds up when he reflects on the “collectivist ideology” of nationality. “There are no nations,” he says, at least not in a way that could “define individuals through their belonging to a human conglomerate marked out as different from others by certain characteristics such as race, language and religion.” For Vargas Llosa, nationalism is always “a lie,” but its rebuttal is to be found not so much in high-toned internationalist universalism as in the dissociative particularities of literature, and especially in a well-narrated novel. The novel, he thinks, articulates a basic human desirethe desire to be “many people, as many as it would take to assuage the burning desires that possess us.” Alternatively, it stands for a basic human rightthe right not to be the same as oneself, let alone the same as other people. And the defiant history of democracy began not in politics but in literature, when Cervantes first tackled “the problem of the narrator,” or the question of who gets to tell the story. No doubt about it: Don Quixote is “a 21st-century novel.”

Continental Drift

Continental Drift

Europe shows signs of life, but Walter Laqueur argues that it’s still dying.

BY GERARD BAKER

If you’ve heard the celebratory noises coming out of European capitals of late, you could be forgiven for thinking that, as with Mark Twain’s prematurely recorded demise, reports of Europe’s death may have been greatly exaggerated. For a continent in the supposed grip of demographic implosion, economic stagnation, political paralysis and existential anomie, the news has been oddly cheerful recently.

In the past year, the rate of economic growth in the eurozone has actually overtaken that of the U.S. The market capitalization of companies quoted on European stock exchanges has surpassed American corporate worth for the first time ever. London has edged ahead of New York in most categories as global financial capital. The euro, closely watched in Europe as a barometer of continental self-respect, is close to its highest level ever against the dollar.

Even Europe’s infamous political stasis may be giving way to a hint of dynamism. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government has defied the odds and pulled off small but important economic reforms. In Nicolas Sarkozy, the French have elected a man so committed to recasting the country’s economy that he is widely viewed among the liberal elites as a dangerous radical.

All this could not have come at a more opportune moment. The European Union’s leaders are in the midst of lengthy celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the European Communities. At the same time, the gloom that enveloped the EU after the French and Dutch rejected its beloved constitutional treaty two years ago has been replaced by a restrained optimism that the show might just be put back on the road this summer.

Is it possible, then, that the writers who have spent the past few years predicting Europe’s collapse could be wrong? The short answer is: no. Even a corpse has been known to twitch once or twice before the rigor mortis sets in. The longer answer is provided by Walter Laqueur in “The Last Days of Europe,” one of the more persuasive in a long line of volumes by authors on both sides of the Atlantic chronicling Europe’s decline and foretelling its collapse.

Unlike the Euro-bashing polemics of a few of those authors, Mr. Laqueur’s short book is measured, even sympathetic. It is mercifully free of references to cheese-eating surrender monkeys and misplaced historical analogies to appeasement. The tone is one of resigned dismay rather than grave-stomping glee. This temperate quality makes the book’s theme–that Europe now faces potentially mortal challenges–all the more compelling.
The demographic problem is by now so familiar that it hardly bears restating. Mr. Laqueur notes that the average European family had five children in the 19th century; today it has fewer than two, a trend that will shrink the continent’s population in the next century on a scale unprecedented in modern history.

The failure of Europeans to reproduce makes it vulnerable to internal schism. Too often Europe has reacted to the growing threat posed by extremists among its minorities with a tolerance and self-criticism that has bordered on capitulation. Meanwhile, social tensions increase, not least because of high emigration to Europe from Muslim countries and high birth rates among Muslim populations. No one has yet found a good way of integrating those populations into mainstream European society.

Even as te challenge from fanatical Islam has intensified, at home and abroad, Europeans have found new ways to abase themselves before it. Two years ago it was the Danish cartoons affair, in which too few politicians and opinion leaders defended the rights of the Danish newspaper that published them; last year it was the collective European cringe in the wake of the pope’s mildly assertive remarks about the disconnect between Islam and reason; this year it has been the embarrassing spectacle of humiliated British servicemen fawning in front of their Iranian captors.

In the economic field, Europe is celebrating a growth rate of 2.5% annually; in the U.S. a similar pace is regarded as a crisis. Meanwhile unemployment remains brutally high and productivity stagnant. Mr. Laqueur notes that Europeans sometimes embrace their economic sluggishness as part of their “soft power” appeal: all those 35-hour weeks, long vacations and generous social benefits. But the long-term cost of their welfare states–and their confiscatory tax rates–may eventually make such luxuries unaffordable.

Mr. Laqueur ponders whether Europe will really surrender to these adverse trends or finally resist. He is not optimistic. Perhaps Europeans will find ways to bolster their birth rates. Perhaps they will stiffen in the face of an escalating terrorist threat. Perhaps Muslims will assimilate better into Europe’s democratic and tolerant societies. Perhaps the pro-American sensibilities and the pro-growth nimbleness of Eastern European countries will drive the rest of the Continent out of the ditch of stagnation and pacifism. Perhaps.
But then again, as Mr. Laqueur observes, museums are filled with the remnants of vanished civilizations. Abroad, the U.S. has long surpassed Europe in power, influence and economic dynamism; Asia may do so before long. At home, a profound demoralization has set in, induced in part by the continent’s ruinous past century.

It was a century in which unimaginable violence sapped the regenerative energies of a wearied people; in which the seductive falsehoods of twin totalitarian ideologies undermined moral self-confidence; in which a flaccid relativism replaced the firm ethical boundaries of religious belief. It was also a century, we now see, in which the luxuries of rapid economic growth produced a false sense of security that cannot be sustained in a global age.

Not dead yet, maybe. But even Mark Twain succumbed eventually to the obituary writers.

Mr. Baker is U.S. editor and an assistant editor of the Times of London. You can buy “The Last Days of Europe” from the OpinionJournal bookstore.

郭飞雄家人拟向中央举报

 

【2007年6月4日狱委讯】自由亚洲电台张敏采访报道/

胡啸律师:郭飞雄要求向中央紧急举报

5月29日,采访报道了维权人士郭飞雄的太太张青转述郭飞雄28日在看守所会见胡啸律师,自诉遭受酷刑逼供,要求紧急向中央举报的消息。
张青接受采访的时候,胡啸律师正乘飞机在返回北京途中,第二天胡啸律师在北京接受我的采访,证实了张青转述的郭飞雄自述,同时也作了些进一步说明。

胡啸律师说:“郭飞雄一方面反复强调要肯定辽宁省看守所以及广州市第三看守所对他的一些文明对待,但同时又说,在辽宁省看守所(被带到秘密地点)遭受刑讯逼供的情况――用高压电棒电击男性生殖器等情况是他不能容忍的,也是要坚持抗争到底的。我们在会见他的时候,他在第一时间就表达,要求紧急向中央举报。在我理解,他不仅是为了他个人,也是为了其他犯罪嫌疑人,被告人所遇到的这种刑讯逼供所作出的一种抗争。但是我们作为承办律师来说,只能根据他个人所遭受的这种以武力以及其它手段对他进行强迫性供述的这种情况,作为控告申诉。”

郭飞雄和郭案简介 

维权人士郭飞雄本名杨茂东,2005年参与广东太石村维权事件,2006年参与营救维权律师高智晟。
2006年9月14日,郭飞雄被以“涉嫌非法经营罪”刑事拘留,9月30日,以同样涉嫌罪名被逮捕。涉案经营的出版物是揭露沈阳官场腐败的《沈阳政坛地震》,经向胡啸律师证实这是一种杂志。
据郭飞雄的亲友说,郭飞雄早在被捕前五年已经停止了所有经营活动。
今年1 月20日郭飞雄被由广州移送转押到沈阳的辽宁省看守所。 
郭飞雄被转押沈阳之前,被羁押于广州市第一看守所。他在会见律师的时候曾经自述,在此被连续审讯七天七夜,被殴打、刑讯逼供,还曾经被双手双脚绑在木板床上四十天。 
郭飞雄案送交检察院后,曾因证据不足两度‘退查’,3月30日第三次移送广州市天河区检察院,郭飞雄也被换押回广州。
5月14日,郭飞雄案移至广州天河区人民法院,预定6月15日开庭。
5月28日胡啸律师在广州第三看守所会见了郭飞雄,郭飞雄自述遭到酷刑逼供。

胡啸律师:郭飞雄承认事实,否认犯罪 ,强调新闻出版自由

胡啸律师还说:“他一方面表示,对于检察机关指控他非法经营,他对主要事实供认,同时又表示这是在刑讯逼供之下作出的。他当时表示,第一方面对于他出版发行、复制印刷《沈阳政坛地震》这本杂志。。。”

问:“是书还是杂志?”
答:“杂志。九十六页。他说对具体事实承认,但不认为此事是犯罪行为,他认为,这件事是符合《中华人民共和国宪法》的,是新闻出版自由的一种行为。并不是涉及犯罪。”

胡啸律师:维护被告人合法权利 

胡啸律师又说:“第三方面,郭飞雄向我们反复表示,对于在辽宁省看守所所遭遇的一些情况――用高压电棒电击男性生殖器的情况,是他所不能容忍的。说‘具体承办人员必须给我以道歉’。秘密道歉,并不是说公开道歉。
他说,对他的这种刑讯逼供,和这些政府行为是无关的,但他对这些具体行为表示抗议,希望这种行为在中国能够消失。同时希望律师能够为他作无罪辩护。
杨茂东同时表示(判决后)不上诉。”

问:“郭飞雄作了这样的自述,提出这样的要求之后,作为他的代理律师,您怎么想呢?”
答:“按照中国的法律,律师在被告人以及犯罪嫌疑人在羁押过程中遭受到刑讯逼供,以及侵犯人身权、民主权的过程中,有责任为其带为申诉控告,所以我们要通过正当、合法、合理途径,维护被告人合法的辩护权以及人身民主权利。”

张青:家人着手向中央举报酷刑 

郭飞雄的家人6月1日再次接受我的采访,表达他们的心情,并且说已经着手准备向中央举报。
郭飞雄的太太张青说:“5月28日,律师会见以后,胡啸律师就告诉我这些情况――受到严重的刑讯逼供。使用了人类文明的底线都不能承受的一种方式,用电棍击打男性生殖器这种行为的时候,我们是非常气愤的。
杨茂东在跟律师会见的时候反复强调,他要求马上向中央举报,口吻是把这当成非常紧急的一件事情,并且要求这件事情在中国彻底绝迹。这种事情实在是太丑恶了。
我们作为家属,准备把这件事情向中央举报,可能是以公开信的形式写出来。
他的姐姐今天(6月1日)就给我打了个电话,在(下午)四点鈡的时候,她说,刚刚开始听到这件事情的时候,她打电话告诉我,不要跟他的哥哥讲,因为他最近身体不好,脸色不太好。但是她今天告诉我‘实在不能把这件事情藏下去,我今天已经告诉他了’。
我们一家人现在为这件事情举报的事,已经开始做了,准备文件。
对于杨茂东的案件,我的态度是非常明确的,就是作无罪辩护。”

杨茂平:会不会报复再施酷刑?很恐惧 

郭飞雄的姐姐,现在住在湖北省的医生杨茂平说:“今天跟我另一个弟弟说了,我们都非常气愤。我们请我们当地的律师也在起草几个东西,肯定处境很艰难的,但是我们要向最高检察院、全国人大控告。
因为太残忍了,那像扒皮一样的痛苦。对我们杨茂东,他们这是想做到底了,陷害到底了,他们用这么残酷的手段,陷害,还打他,我不知道为什么,杨茂东到底跟他们有什么深仇大恨?非常不理解的,真是无法无天了!
我弟弟从小是我养大的,他很小没有母亲。既然别人叫我弟弟这样,他今天受的一切,比我本身受到这样更叫我难受。
律师说了‘他们会不会报复性再作?’是很恐惧的。”

杨茂平:回想警官上门说的话 

杨茂平听了郭飞雄对胡啸律师的自述后,回忆起2月份以来警方上门对她讲的话。
杨茂平说:“杨茂东说他在2月12日被打,2月13日他自杀。在2月14日或15日那时候,是春节前,辽宁省警方来了两个人,其中一个姓杨,他们叫他‘杨政委’,这个人到我家来过两次。
他来找我们单位,找到我说‘我们现在是为了挽救杨茂东’,他都扯到政治的事件。他说‘太石村他(杨茂东)扯什么,他算老几?他什么事?他如果说得好,我们可以不判,或者轻判,如果说得不好,可以说‘两万册’,‘五万册’,‘六万册’,我们都可以说。我们也可以虚判,也可以判他五到八年’。就这样亲自说的话。
当时他让我给杨茂东带去一些问候的话,我给他带了。他要叫我劝杨茂东写一些悔过,我说‘杨茂东有什么东西要悔过呢?’
他是警官,他是公安局的,他有什么权力说判几年,不判几年?走法律程序,只是一个过场。”

张青家中电话工作不正常 

杨茂平说张青家中现在电话线路工作不正常。她说:“我今天下午给她打电话,打了好长时间,就好像她在跟别人通话,最后我大概在五点多鈡又给她打,她接了,她说(那个时间)没打电话。”
我在这个星期也几次遇到这样的情况。

滕彪博士:中国《刑法》禁止酷刑,中国酷刑逼供普遍 

在北京的法学博士腾彪律师说:“我看到了郭飞雄遭受酷刑的相关报道。我觉得这种酷刑是非常残酷的,也是中国《刑法》明确禁止的。我觉得相关的一些人员可能构成了刑讯逼供犯罪。
在我参与过的一些刑事案件当中,我发现这种酷刑也是非常普遍的、也是非常残酷的,甚至有一些我介入的死刑的案件,也是一些办案人员通过刑讯逼供,把一些完全无罪的人给安上死刑的罪名,在中国也不是个别的现象。
所以,我觉得,在中国要想减少酷刑,还需要做很多很多的工作。”

滕彪博士:办案机关施酷刑,报案常无结果 

问:“像现在这种情况,法律上规定有什么途径能够向有关方面,比方起诉啊,有没有这方面明确的规定?”
答:“刑讯逼供是属于违反《刑法》的犯罪,可以向公安机关,或者检察机关报案,要求立案。但是,由于这些酷刑本身就是这些办案机关他们自己施加的,所以,在实践当中,来自于受害人,或者普通公民的这种报案,往往也没有什么结果。只能靠上级检察机关的监督,揭露出来的这些案件,或者受到处理的官员,往往都是因为各种偶然的原因,或者是政治斗争的原因,才得到处理。”

问:“您看关于向中央举报,是不是从程序上说,或现行法律规定上有这么一个途径呢?”
答:“在《宪法》上规定了有公民的检举控告的权利。但是,从实践来看,这些信访、举报、检举经常也得不到任何回应,没有一个非常有效的渠道。”

滕彪博士:法庭使用刑讯逼供取得的“证据”

问:“一般在开庭之前,如果发现现有的口供,或者相关的被叫作‘证据’的材料里,有刑讯逼供因素的话,那么应该怎么样来对待这个‘证据’和即将开庭的庭上来使用这些所谓‘证据’材料?”
答:“在实践当中,刑讯逼供得到的这些‘证据’,在法庭上,还是没有加以排除。即使参与刑讯逼供的这些办案人员受到了处分,或者受到了法律的追究,他们通过这种非法手段得到的‘证据’也往往被法官加以使用。
因为中国没有法官独立的制度,所以这些案件往往在开庭之前就定了结果。所以,这些用非法手段取得的‘证据’可能仍然被加以使用。”

滕彪博士:需立《刑事证据法》,缓解酷刑 

问:“在这样一个阶段,作为一个法学方面的专家,您觉得有什么可做的事情能够使您上面所说的这种状况终结?”
答:“实际上,我们也一直在做一些具体的工作,比如说,召开一些研讨会,关于‘律师在场权’的问题,对犯罪嫌疑人进行预审的时候,应该有律师在场,给他们提供法律帮助。另外,我们也有一些律师、学者在着手进行《刑事证据法》的起草,或者立法建议。
中国目前还没有一个可操作的‘刑事证据规则’,如果这个‘刑事证据规则’能够公布,并且付诸实施的话,对于酷刑的现象可能也会有所缓解。

滕彪博士:中国欺骗国际社会,司法体系需大变革 

滕彪先生认为 :“总体说来,还需要整个的司法体系的大的变革,才有可能从根本上改变这种状况。
关于酷刑的问题,从十几年前中国就已经正式签署、并且批准了联合国的《反酷刑公约》。按照这个公约的要求,中国每隔几年就要向联合国提交中国履行《反酷刑公约》相关义务的报告。
但是,我注意到中国政府在提交这些报告的时候,完全无视中国现实发生的一些事情,实际上等于是在欺骗国际社会。
我觉得,从这个角度来讲,郭飞熊遭受到这个酷刑也不是偶然的。整个的这个体制一直是在默许,甚至怂恿这些酷刑的存在。”

范亚峰博士:“法治”建设与“人治”酷刑传统的斗争 

在北京的法学博士范亚峰先生说:“我觉得这个事情体现了中国走向法制,在法制建设过程当中非常艰苦的挣扎。在郭飞熊先生的身上体现出这种‘法治’和这种极为漫长的‘人治’的酷刑传统的斗争。
应该说,在这个案件过程当中,既有检察院系统对于法律程序的捍卫,两次退回补充侦察,也有一些执法部门,像现在所申述的酷刑的运用。
在这个事情当中,我觉得可以看出来两种规则模式之间,在过渡当中是一个非常艰苦的冲突和斗争。这对于维权人士来讲,意味着有志于推进中国的法制进步、民主建设的维权行动人士,为此要作好充分的思想准备,承担更多的牺牲。”

范亚峰博士:现代社会四种“规则生成”的模式

范亚峰博士分析:“ 从另外一个角度看,这件事情也体现一点,就是在这样一个案件当中,和今天(6月1日)厦门民众游行,引起厦门政府让步,停建了厦门的PX项目,两者之间比较来看,厦门民众的维权行动,我认为,应该是整合了现代社会四种‘规则生成’的模式――‘民主的模式’,就是今天行使集会游行示威的自由,这是一种‘规则生成’的模式;另外是‘法制的模式’、‘技术的模式’,就是说,维权行动当中,对于互联网、对于手机、对于数码相机的运用,以及视屏技术的运用。以及‘专家模式’,像赵玉芬院士等很多专家积极参与到这样一个环保行动当中来,使得这样一个环保维权行动取得初步阶段性良性互动的成果。
和厦门PX项目的维权相比,我们可以看到,在郭飞熊先生的案件当中,向‘法制’、‘民主’、‘专家’、‘技术’这四种生成模式的整合,相对而言,在力量上很明显处于一种不均衡的状态。

范亚峰博士:中国社会矛盾进入相对较突出时期 

问:“在现在这种情况下,有关各方面能够做些什么来推动中国的法制建设,向更良性的轨道运作,或者说有所转变?”
答:“我觉得,最近在郭飞雄先生开庭的前后,中国社会从去年以来到现在,应该说已经进入了一个比较关键的时期。
这个关键时期,像广西的计划生育的风暴,体现出来的人口问题;像江苏太湖无锡的水资源危机体现出来的资源问题;像厦门PX项目所引起的环境问题。这几个问题都是引起涉及面非常广泛的群体性权利的重大事件。
从这几个事件,以及最近股市的波动,印花税通过前后所引起的争议,这些事情来看,很显然中国社会的社会矛盾进入了一个相对而言比较突出的时期。在这当中,中国官方构建‘和谐社会’的任务那就非常繁重。
我们看到,环境、人口、资源所引发的背后是强势集团和弱势集团规则和资源的分配所展开的博弈。维权运动的实质就是在这个地方,就是说,抑豪强,兴民权,抑官权,实现公民权利和国家权力的平衡。”

范亚峰博士:郭飞雄案有标志性意义

范亚峰先生认为:“郭飞熊先生应该说是一个致力于用非暴力的方式、和平的方式推动中国进步的维权人士。对对他审判应该说具有相当大的标志性意义。
我们知道,就是像历史上许多从事非暴力运动的人本身,自己要承担更多的痛苦和苦难。像甘地和马丁.路德金都是这样的,他们为自己的信念付出比常人更多的牺牲和代价。
所以我想,郭飞雄先生也是一个充满张力的人,也有不少缺点,但是我个人对他的勇气和人格力量是非常钦佩的。
并且我也认为,辽宁高层领导和广东省的司法系统近来对郭飞雄先生的案件表现出相当大的善意,联系到高智晟律师案件当中这样一个轻判,所带来的官方民间一定程度上的良性互动,所以我认为对郭飞雄先生的这个案件,应该采取一个从轻的方式。这样,有助于积累中国社会法制和民主的规则,有助于促进官方和民间的良性互动。”