“十大国学大师”网评榜出炉引发争议

鲁迅名列“十大国学大师”

“十大国学大师”的网评榜单日前新鲜出炉,他们分别是王国维、钱钟书、胡适、鲁迅、梁启超、蔡元培、章太炎、陈寅恪、郭沫若和冯友兰。评选活动自4月12日启动以来,通过网络、邮寄、短信等方式,共收到来自两岸三地以及海外华人的120多万张选票,其中王国维以最高得票数位居榜首。而康有为、辜鸿铭的落选和鲁迅的入选则引起了各界强烈争议。

此次评选结果的亮相,是弘扬国学还是娱乐媚俗以及“鲁迅算不算国学大师”,则成了这场争议热点中的焦点。

由国学网、中国人民大学国学院主办的“我心目中的国学大师评选”活动,在引起网民关注的同时,也产生了极大的争议。有人觉得,这是互联网时代弘扬国学的创新之举,也有人认为,这是把严肃庄重的国学娱乐化,变成“超女式”的“海选”活动。

鲁迅———文学还是国学大师?

“十大国学大师”的榜单公布以后,鲁迅的入选引起了极大的争议。反对鲁迅入选者认为,国学大师对国学的研究一定要深要透,要成为专家,“鲁迅不但没有做到这点,还推行白话文毁灭文言,怎么能算是国学大师呢?”支持者则指出,鲁迅不但有巨大的文学成就,还有深邃的鲁迅思想,传统文化方面底蕴也很深厚,所以当选“国学大师”当之无愧。

支持“文学大师”派

“鲁迅应该说是文学大师。鲁迅在国学上倡导少读甚至不读古书,而对西方的一些东西比较推崇。而在国学方面,有很多人的造诣和贡献都要比鲁迅大。”首都师范大学文学院吴相洲教授如是说。中国人民大学国学院院长助理孟宪实也表示了类似看法:“鲁迅在‘整理国故’中确曾做过一些工作,但和他的小说散文创作相比,这并不是突出的成绩。他还曾努力贬低传统,对国学也没有推崇。这好像不是国学大师应有的态度。”

而作为我国著名国学名家姜亮夫的弟子、中国美术学院教授章祖安则指出,凡是研究先秦以后文化的学者,成就卓著也称不上国学大师,“谁听说过研究唐诗宋词、明清小说的被称为国学大师的?”按照这一标准,如鲁迅这样的大文豪也未必能称得上国学大师了。

  支持“国学大师”派

清华大学的刘石教授列出了评选鲁迅为“国学大师”的四点理由:第一、鲁迅是真正的国学研究大家,他在每一个研究领域都达到经典的高度。比如其《中国小说史略》是一部自成体系的中国小说通史,为中国小说史研究奠定了第一块基石,始终影响着后学;第二、鲁迅开创了将文学与文化结合起来的新的研究方法,比如其《魏晋风度及文章与药及酒之关系》,对文学史研究者具有方法论的启发意义;第三、鲁迅在古籍整理方面有重要成果,“比如他的《鲁迅辑录古籍丛编》,就非常严谨、规范,已具有现代古籍整理的特点”;第四、鲁迅对中国文化的影响力极其深远,堪称中国人的“精神导师”。

[声音]

“评选需要专业门槛,不能不知其所以然”

中山大学哲学博士陈壁生撰写了《莫把“国学大师”当“超级女声”》一文,文中指出,“‘国学’既为‘学’,便有其专业性,甚至可以跟公众的日常生活根本无关,例如边疆史、史前史的研究。所以,要评判谁是‘国学大师’是需要专业门槛的,就好像评价肖邦的音乐、凡?高的油画需要专业知识一样。”他认为,由于大多数网友都不了解何谓“国学”,也不具备评判谁为“大师”的专业知识,所以,用“超女”方式来评选,结果就是谁在公众中有知名度,谁就是大师。

“人们在选出蔡元培的时候,想到的不会是他的《中国伦理学史》,而是他在北京大学当校长的业绩;在选出胡适的时候,想到的一定不是他的《水经注》研究、哲学史研究,而是他作为五四文化革命主将的那些激动人心的文章;在选出钱钟书的时候,想的也一定不是《管锥篇》(因为绝大多数人都看不懂那些深奥文字)而会是《围城》。”一些学者表示“所以基本可以判定,很多‘大师’之所以会被选出来,绝不会是因为学术成就。而很多真正为国学做出过重大贡献的大师,通过这种‘超女式’的评选方式,也永远不可能被注意到。”

[回音壁]

“评选中让大家知道国学是怎么回事就行”

面对非议,主办方指出,在快捷的信息时代,真正有价值的信息如果不想被湮没,就必须要以现代高技术的方式,如借助电视、网络等媒体,出现在大众的视线内。正如学者骆玉明所说:“陈寅恪的书非常枯燥难读,我相信专业学者都没几个能读完他的著作。可是,随便哪个读者都很容易在报章上反复看到一些‘大师’们的奇闻轶事,诸如钱钟书有‘下蛋的母鸡’的名言、王国维有‘自沉迷案’,这些都给读者留下了深刻的印象。”

“我们组织评选国学大师,并不是想去评论国学大师的学术水平,而是想让大家通过投票参与,通过一些争论能够对此有所了解。从弘扬国学的角度来说,首先就是要让大家知道国学是怎么回事。同时,我们也是想知道,究竟哪些人在网友心目中是国学大师。”主办方表示,一个学者的知名度和他的学术成就有时候并不一定成正比,“所以我们的评选,请了冯其镛、汤一介等老先生过来把关,也请他们为整个评选活动提供50位候选学者的名单。”

链接

何谓“国学”

20世纪初梁启超、章太炎等人提出“国学”概念时,“国学”指的是“相对于西方学术的本国传统学术”———主要内容是小学,包括训诂、文字、音韵;经学,包括经史子集。

章太炎曾提出国学的三个主体部分,就是“义理、考据和辞章”。而作为我国著名国学学者姜亮夫的弟子、年近70的中国美术学院教授章祖安,则对“国学”一词作了更为详尽的诠释:“国学的根基是小学、章句之学,因此,所谓‘国学大师’必须以博通、精研先秦时代的原典为前提。在此基础上列出三个条件:一、在其中某一领域有原创性成果。二、精通小学,古文辞(各体式)、古体诗、近体诗词都能自由挥洒,出色当行。如果是20世纪的国学大师,还必须加上条件三:能汲取外来之学说,而不忘民族之本位,中西兼通,而又以传统文化为其治学指归。”

新加坡二十一届世界书展 52万人次参观

新加坡第二十一届世界书展4日圆满落幕,为期8的书展估计一共吸引52万人次参观,刚过的周末更是人潮汹涌,把书展的气氛推向最高潮。

据报道,展出近30万册书籍的世界书展可说是爱书者的天堂,从儿童图书到美容保健书刊都应有尽有,在各方面都迎合了各年龄层读者的不同需求及喜好。43岁的家庭主妇陈莉香是第一次参观世界书展。她说:“这里要找书很方便,我不只能够为孩子选购课外作业簿、趁学校假期带他们来这里看书,自己也找到了一些食谱书。”每年都抽空逛书展的29岁前中文教师王丽娟则表示:“我较喜欢阅读文学作品,希望主办当局在将来的书展上多介绍类似书籍,而不只是有关大众文化的书籍。或许他们可以介绍台湾10大畅销书籍之类的。”对于公众的热烈反应,担任本届世界书展工委会主席的新加坡报业控股执行副总裁(华文报集团行政部及文化产业部)萧作鸣说:“虽然这个6月在岛国有多项大型活动,如新加坡热卖会正在进行,许多人也趁学校假期出国旅行,本届书展尚吸引了52万人次参观,我们感到欣慰。”他也表示,这次配合书展推出的亚细安出版协会展览馆及《汉字—从甲骨文到计算器》展览都吸引了好些人前来浏览。此外,在这次书展中举行的几场中英文研讨会、作家讲座及签名会,还有不少出版社推出的各种海内外新书,也为书展增色不少。世界书展由新加坡报业控股华文报集团与名创商业信息私人有限公司联合主办,今年的主题是“与出版世界接轨”,共汇集了11个国家的200个参展商展出将近30万册书,其中包括了3500种新书。

桔子红了又落 琦君7日在台病逝

“台湾文坛上闪亮的恒星”之誉的著名作家琦君,7日凌晨在台北病逝。她的部分散文被选入台湾地区中学课本,影响了台湾几代人;根据其同名小说改编的电视剧《橘子红了》近年风靡海峡两岸。
  
  据台湾媒体报道,曾旅居美国多年的琦君这几年才返台定居。她于5月13日因感冒感染肺炎而住院治疗,20日因呼吸困难住进加护病房。
  
  琦君本名潘希真,浙江永嘉人,1917年生于温州,毕业于杭州之江大学中文系,曾任台湾中央大学、文化大学等校中文系教授,著有《母亲的金手表》《橘子红了》《三更有梦书当枕》等散文及小说、儿童文学作品。台湾《中国时报》一项调查显示,琦君是近30年来台湾地区作品最畅销的女作家。
  
  在台湾女作家中,琦君以古典文学根基深厚而闻名,也被视为台湾散文大家。相关研究专家指出,琦君散文的独特性,是“无论写人、写事、写物,都在平常无奇中含蓄至理,在清淡朴素中见出秀美”。
  
  有评论认为,琦君写得最好最多的,是怀乡思亲的散文。她也是台湾同胞爱国怀乡情怀的优秀“代言人”。对于此类散文写作的缘起,她曾在《烟愁》后记中这样说:“像树木花草似的,谁能没有根呢?我常常想,我若能忘掉亲人师友,忘掉童年,忘掉故乡,我若能不再哭,我宁愿搁下笔,此生永不再写,然而,这怎么可能呢?”

海外文坛短讯–06.09

  ●席勒的故乡德国城市Marbach周二成立了当代文学博物馆,其中收藏了尼采的死亡面具和卡夫卡《审判》手稿。

  ●著名摄影师ArnoldNewman去世,他为作曲家斯特拉文斯基和画家毕加索拍摄的照片是摄影史上的经典。

  ●伏尔泰写给叶卡捷琳娜的26封信可能回归克里姆林宫,信中伏尔泰赞扬了女皇,而嘲讽了法国宫廷的奢侈生活。

  ●因1861年《比特恩夫人的家居手册》一书而在北美家喻户晓的“家庭主妇始祖”比特恩夫人近期被发现其真人竟然不会做饭。

中国文学再掀西进风潮

近日,多位中国作家进入法国市场。王安忆的《长恨歌》、慕容雪村的《成都,今夜请把我遗忘》、杨红樱的《马小跳系列》推出了法文版。刚从法国和德国签售归来的毕飞宇认为,西方读者渴望通过阅读中国文学印证媒体对当代中国的报道。

  西方读者渴望了解真实的中国

  《长恨歌》法文版于今年2月由法国毕基埃出版社推出,出版后立即引起了媒体和读者的关注。据毕基埃出版社中国文化总策划陈丰介绍,该书起印4000册,出版两个月后即加印,目前几乎每天都能接到法国各大书店的订单。

  《世界报》发表评论称:“最令人震惊的是作家对这座城市的刻画。上海是一种历经了磨难和制度变迁的延续性的奇迹。”

  法国书业最权威的刊物《图书周报》称,在王安忆的笔下,上海“有了精致的质感,色彩斑斓,波纹闪烁,如同一幅书法作品。”

  最近,毕飞宇刚从法国、德国签售归来,他的《青衣》、《玉米》、《玉秧》先后被翻译成法文、德文等版本出版,《平原》也正在翻译之中,在接受西方媒体采访时,他表示,经常被记者问到老百姓的日常生活、女性问题和经济奇迹等问题。“西方读者渴望从中国文学中找到影子,从而了解中国文化和日常生活的真实模样。”毕飞宇说。

  非现实作品不被西方看好

  曾长期在国外生活的作家徐星认为,西方媒体越来越多地报道中国,但西方读者无法从过去已经翻译的中国文学作品中得到印证,这就是中国作家的非现实作品并不受西方读者看好的原因,他们更希望读到书写中国当下生活的作品。他说:“在欧洲,他在书店经常看到一些中国一线作家的作品被摆放在书架的角落,这些译作多是涉及中国历史、民俗或符号的题材,而哈金等美国华人作家的作品却被摆在书架抢眼的位置。”

  据悉,王安忆和莫言已接到参加法国圣·马罗国际文学书展的邀请,这个书展主要推介世界各国重要作家和作品,去年被邀请的中国作家有毕飞宇和苏童。今年书展的主题是远东文学。之后王安忆还将访问巴黎和法国南部,与媒体见面,签名售书。

失去的世界是否如此迷人

《街头文化——成都公共空间、下层民众与地方政治,1870-1930》,
王笛著,李德英、谢继华、邓丽译,中国人民大学出版社2006年2月版,33.80元。

  
  失去的世界是否如此迷人

  《街头文化》探讨下层民众、地方精英与国家权力复杂的街头角力,以历史叙事的笔法重构消失于现代化进程中的城市,且不乏现实的关怀
  
  归马雷 (特约书评人)
  
  王笛关于一百多年前内陆城市成都的历史研究著作是在2003年由美国斯坦福大学出版社出版,换言之,这本《街头文化——成都公共空间、下层民众与地方政治,1870-1930》乃是诞生于西方学术氛围里,从作者的学术训练、研究方式以及叙述方式都带有强烈的西方学术著作的特点,进而言之,它与近20年来为中国人所知的研究中国(包括中国人)的西方学术著作是一脉相承,是神似的。西方(尤其是美国)对中国近代史的研究扬弃大历史的叙述,而着迷于地域与社会结构分解下的细部观察,我们所熟悉的史景迁、魏斐德等人,都把对下层民众、日常生活的研究纳入自己的研究范围。作为负笈美国的中国学者,王笛走向“历史叙事”道路实属正常,也正因为如此,我们得以一窥在冷静与理性的学术研究背后,在对一百多年来消失于现代化进程中的城市的文字重建中,作者笔下的一份现实关怀和激越之情。当2003年《街头文化》出版之后,《太平洋事务》杂志有书评指出,“王笛为成都失去传统的街头文化而惋惜,但值得怀疑的是,所失去的世界是否像王笛所描述的那么迷人”。作为历史学者,十年前王笛以研究地方精英为出发点,写出了《跨出封闭的世界——长江上游区域社会研究,1644-1911》,而十年之后,《街头文化》的“主角”已经变成了下层民众,这或许是那份招人怀疑的激情原因所在。但作者亦坦承,十年间的两本著作,“反映了我的学术兴趣、学术观念、学术方法极大的转变”。

  这些既表明了作者对《街头文化》的写法,也预示了读者的读法。
  
  茶馆里的卑微灵魂:你为什么没有自己的声音

  美国芝加哥学派社会学家威廉·富特·怀特最为著名的学术著作是《街角社会》,研究波士顿意大利人贫民区的生存状态,尤其是不法帮派组织。这部出版于1943年的书固然获得了巨大的声誉,半个多世纪以来被奉为社会学方面的经典之作,然而十多年前也有学者批评怀特的研究方法(他以一个实证者的身份写了这部著作)。相比之下,历史学遭遇的障碍似乎并不比这要少,如前所述,历史研究的视角已经发生了重大的改变,不再是宏大的历史事件的叙事,也不是单一的政治或者经济历史的局限性研究,而是方法交叉甚多,且材料所用日渐繁琐细致。当我们读到怀特以亲历者的身份勾勒科纳维尔街上的人们时,那叙述就是历史,而当我们进入1870-1930年的内陆城市成都时,遭遇的是史学的问题:将如何重新构建这个城市?或者说,将以何种手法向读者描述——同时也是解释一个全新的结论。从某种意义上说,正因为王笛采取了从街头、从下层民众入手的方式,进而将“街头文化”这个混杂了政治角力、经济关系、文化生态在内的课题全面展开,才能跃过这个障碍,让人信服。

  如果我们从一个学术名词“晚期中华帝国”的时间推断开始,那么关于街头,可以说是越来越重要的社会场所。从清末民初开始,“变革”与“革命”两个词就占据了历史的舞台,成为重要的母题,而近代历史上的重大政治剧目,无不与街头有着千丝万缕的关系。对于王笛笔下的成都而言,街头是这样一个历史舞台,几乎容纳了各种社会力量的存在,但要首先着手于它所承载的下层民众的日常生活(该书第一部),其次才能从日常生活的内容,来叙述下层民众与地方精英、国家权力这三者之间的冲突、控制,才能将普通的街头事件与公共决策联系起来。着眼于下层民众,势必从原始材料中进行鉴别与选择,因为保存下来的文字资料基本上都是地方精英的手笔,街头文化的内涵有很大部分是属于地方精英的“功劳”。在他们笔下,下层民众是没有自己的声音的,在后者那里,只有街头这样的空间可以展示他们的不满与愤怒,抗争与胜利。这一切都会在不是由他们“话事”的文字史料中曲折表现。王笛大量选择地方精英如办警察的周善培的政策、改革派人物傅崇矩的报纸以及民初文学家如李颉人的小说,“打倒孔家店老英雄”吴虞的晚年日记等等材料,此外也集中研究了清末民初的外国人所写的游记、论文,还有摄影图片,这些都生动地展现了街头文化的丰富内容。这其中最为直接有效的一部分属于成都的茶馆,这是下层民众的核心,也是“街头文化”的核心,该书138页两张成都茶馆的照片,相隔半个多世纪以上,但是除了人物、服装不同外,面容、器具以及喝茶聊天的形式几乎完全没有变化。或者可以说,成都茶馆一直就是这些人的生活方式,这一片土地上人们的日常生活有意无意继承了传统色彩的生活方式和生活智慧。所以细化研究茶馆是该书一个突出的部分(同时也是王笛学术研究中一个重要的部分),对茶馆的研究,其实也是在研究这些没有权利发出声音的人是如何把属于自己群体的声音发散出去,且影响地方精英们的决策。

  必须指出,在成都这个古老的内陆城市,涉及本书研究的时间段里(1870-1930),大部分时间属于自治时期。有清一代,整个城市的官方控制相当有限,保甲制度下知县并不介入社区事务,成都直到1928年才正式成立了市政府。换句话说,在这个研究时期内,成都的公共决策、公共权力的分配,都与公共空间(街头)有着莫大的关系。一切前因后果都在街上上演。《街头文化》的优点就在于,它厘清了下层民众、地方精英和后来的国家权力三者之间的合作、斗争、摩擦等等关系,最终为我们摸清历史中“改良”与“革命”的脉络所在。像书中提到的如地方精英通过办报纸等形式讽喻下层民众,对于一切陋习(主要集中在下层民众身上)的严厉批评,对于发达、自强的渴望心理,并非一个地方性的表现。而在社会变革之时,地方精英联手下层民众的反抗(如清末的保路运动),也不是一个简单的误导问题,更不是简单地归结为现代化进程问题。诚然,王笛对于这个话题不无商榷之意,但是他始终将发生的故事定于事出有因的框架之内,始终是一个具体而微的现实的问题,尽管王笛对于传统世界的消失不乏遗憾,但严格地说这份关切并未取代理性的学术分析。
  
  寻找大卫·格拉汉姆:一个与学术品质有关的话题

  《街角社会》再版时,怀特收录了一篇演讲稿,《怀特对一个弱者的影响》,这位演讲者证明了他在怀特这本书的帮助下,从一个科纳维尔街的小混混转变为出色的城市精英(而不是科里昂集团的一员更不是成为科里昂)。这个浪子回头的个案解答了一部社会学的现实影响。而对于《街头社会》来讲,它的影响是来自历史的影响,比如王笛比较1920年代大卫·格拉汉姆收集的一张年画与他自己20
02年在成都买到的年画只有非常细微的差别,又如在保路运动期间,成都一位普通轿夫捐出他的血汗钱说:“苦力也是公民。”传统的东西并未全部消失,而不少历史存在则依然闪光。《街头文化》深入社会事件的分析方法至少有助于分清现实中所赋予成都的“休闲”、“成都,××××遗忘”的喧哗,破除现实生活中某些大行其道的虚妄与神话。城市建设与城市文化的保护,在还原与对照之下,分清何种为时代所沉淀,何种为现实所应当提炼,这不仅是一座城市的现实。

  王笛在本书的中文版自序中提到一段插曲。《街头文化》英文版在美国斯坦福大学出版社出版之前,有着一系列严格的学术著作出版规定需要履行,包括书中用到的资料来源和版权问题。因为书中有三幅插图不具备上述资格,王笛必须找到图片拥有者大卫·格拉汉姆,后者于1916年-1926年间在四川作田野调查时收集到的民俗画对此书来讲重要异常。各种途径用尽,终于找到了大卫·格拉汉姆的后人,取得了图片的授权。也是这次寻找,王笛“结识”了这位大卫·格拉汉姆,他还有一个中国名字叫葛维汉,20世纪30年代初,他在华西大学博物馆当馆长,1934年,由他牵头组织了最早的三星堆遗址的发掘工作。

  对于《街头文化》这本书而言,“寻找大卫·格拉汉姆”的确像一段无关紧要的插曲,而当我们谈论它时,则又容易走上大讲简单道理甚至标榜道德标兵的一面。但无论如何,在使这种“笨力气”的人不多的今天,在读者动辄遭遇“鉴于引文过于繁琐”而引用不全或者一概不引的今天,尤其是缺乏学术规范的今天,这段插曲无疑具有最好的现实。虽然,这似乎是抹杀了《街头文化》在历史学上、在学术品种上的巨大影响和应有的意义,但毕竟后者的见效需要时间——这样的研究尤其需要时间。
  
  访谈
  
  南方都市报:《街头文化》的副标题是“成都公共空间、下层民众与地方政治,1870-1930”,能否谈谈是什么契机促使你着手这一细微课题的?

  王笛:成都是我的家乡,我在那里出生、读书、工作,一直到1991年赴美,可以说我是在成都的文化氛围中蕴育成长的。

  这本书是我在约翰·霍普金斯大学博士论文基础上发展而来的。我试图从比较微观的角度,来考察研究的对象。过去我们研究历史,钟情于宏观历史和历史上的风云人物,因此,整个中国的历史书写,从根本上看,可以说是一个帝王将相、英雄以及知识精英的历史。因为我们相信,只有写他们,才能建构有关民族-国家命运的宏大叙事,才能体现史学家的使命感。我们似乎不屑把精力浪费上那些在历史上默默无闻的芸芸众生之上,生恐这样便降低了我们历史研究的意义。其实,难道我们不认为每天的日常生活,较之突发的政治事件,更贴近我们的命运吗?

  南方都市报:在中文版自序中,你说“虽然本书是研究过去的历史、社会和文化,但我却有着现实的关怀”,这种“现实的关怀”是否《街头文化》一书的主要目的?您写这本书想传达出中国城市历史研究的什么理念?

  王笛:虽然我到美国已经十多年了,但几乎每年都回国,每次回国,都强烈感受到中国城市的面貌在发生剧变,变得更繁荣和现代化了。当然这是中国改革开放的成就的证明,但同时也有某种担忧。就在这一派繁荣的同时,一个个古代的城市就在我们的眼前消失一天天消失了。现在,我们从南到北旅行,无论是大都市还是小县城,格局几乎是大同小异,中国城市过去由于地理、历史和文化形成的各自的城市外观和特点,幸存无多或几乎不复存在。我只好通过这本书从一个侧面来重构这个已经消失的城市,来寄托对这个古都的怀念。

  我写这本书的主要目的,是试图对过去城市现代化问题进行反思。现代化带给人们的积极结果是不容否认的,但是我们对现代化过程中失掉了什么却并不清楚,特别是我们不关心一般民众、特别是下层民众,在社会的剧变中到底得到了多大的利益,因为我们的眼光总是焦距在近代改良、革命等那些显示“进步”的方方面面。我们忽视了这样的问题:尽管领导现代化的精英们经常可以代表一般民众的利益,但精英和民众的诉求并不总是一致的,而且事实上现代化也是经常以牺牲一般民众的利益为代价的。这个研究仅仅是从人民使用公共空间这一方面来具体分析下层民众究竟付出了怎样的代价,实际上也力图说明,我们在文化上究竟得到了什么,同时又失掉了什么。

  记者 戴新伟

Soldier, spy

Soldier, spy

Some see a troubling ‘militarization’ of American intelligence. What that means for national security may have less to do with bureaucratic turf wars than with what the military thinks intelligence is for.

A satellite image of Hilla, Iraq, overlaid with information from Army engineers. Images such as these have provided tactical intelligence to soldiers on the ground.
A satellite image of Hilla, Iraq, overlaid with information from Army engineers. Images such as these have provided tactical intelligence to soldiers on the ground. (The New York Times)

THE CIA WAS CREATED in 1947 in response to what was at the time the greatest intelligence failure in American history: the inability to foresee, despite myriad clues, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The military had little interest in the creation of a competitor to its own intelligence services. But, according to Thomas Powers, a historian of intelligence and author of ”The Man Who Kept the Secrets” (1979), a biography of the CIA director Richard Helms, the decision to put the new intelligence agency under civilian rather than military control grew partly out of the disdain with which the military officer corps regarded intelligence work.

”Serious military officers didn’t want intelligence assignments, they wanted to control troops in the field,” Powers says. ”Intelligence assignments took one off the track for a general’s star.”

Today, the Defense Department can safely be said to take intelligence more seriously. Eighty percent of the national intelligence budget goes to the Pentagon, which contains the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the intelligence branches of each of the armed services. Traditionally, though, the CIA, because it coordinated all of the other intelligence agencies and packaged the resulting information into the president’s daily intelligence briefing, was preeminent.

That changed in 2004, when congressional legislation that grew out of the 9/11 Commission report in effect demoted the agency. At the same time, there’s been a sense among legislators and intelligence insiders that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his undersecretary in charge of intelligence, Stephen Cambone, have aggressively pushed to bring more intelligence functions under the Pentagon’s umbrella. That effort includes, for example, the creation of an organization, the Strategic Support Branch, with the authority to recruit spies and run counterterrorism operations even in places far from the battlefield-jobs traditionally left to the CIA.

This may help explain why President Bush’s nomination of Michael Hayden, an active-duty Air Force general, to replace former congressman Porter Goss as the next CIA director touched off a worried clamor about the agency’s independence from military meddling. Representative Peter Hoekstra, the Republican chair of the House Intelligence Committee, called Hayden-who ran the NA before becoming National Intelligence Director John Negroponte’s second in command-“the wrong man at the wrong place at the wrong time.” Other lawmakers, Democrat and Republican, expressed similar concerns.

To some national security experts and former intelligence officials, the fears about Hayden are overblown. As they point out, several active-duty military officers have led the CIA in the past, and Hayden, when he headed the NSA, publicly stood up to Rumsfeld on the issue of intelligence funding. But that doesn’t mean, those same observers argue, that there’s no cause for concern about what many see as the broader ”militarization” of American intelligence.

Hayden’s nomination has been portrayed as part of a turf war between Rumsfeld and Negroponte (both have publicly rejected that interpretation). But bureaucratic gamesmanship aside, what does it mean for the Pentagon to take a greater role in intelligence? What effect could it have on what professionals call the ”intelligence product”-the information and analysis that the government uses to try to better understand its friends and enemies?

. . .

The Pentagon’s push into covert operations-the use of Special Operations teams, for example, to hunt down suspected al Qaeda members-has generated a fair amount of news coverage. But it’s not just uniformed officers who think soldiers might have a role to play in that area. ”There are arguments on both sides of this issue,” says John Prados, a senior fellow at the National Security Archive and the biographer of former CIA director William Colby, ”but the general consensus of experts who have looked at this-including the 9/11 Commission, which explicitly recommended this in its report-has been to hand the covert missions to the military.” Many such operations, after all, are essentially military in nature and already rely heavily on military training and logistics.

What worries some experts, however, is a shift in the balance of power within the US intelligence infrastructure as the CIA is weakened and the Pentagon expands its role. For one thing, the Pentagon’s intelligence activities largely escape congressional scrutiny. ”Rumsfeld and Cambone claim that everything they do is a military operation,” says Richard Clarke, the former head of counterterrorism at the National Security Council, ”[and] that therefore nothing that they do should have oversight by the House and Senate intelligence committees. But they are doing things that are clearly intelligence.”

Up until now, another check on Pentagon intelligence agencies has been the CIA itself. During the Cold War, CIA intelligence estimates provided a counterpoint to Pentagon assessments, which tended to reflect the Pentagon’s own institutional desires by producing larger estimates of the Soviet arsenal and more pessimistic assessments of Soviet intentions. ”If we had the military in control of intelligence, they’d always get all the weapons systems they wanted,” Powers says. Historically, ”they’ve delivered intelligence that can help them in political battles over the missile programs, tank programs, and submarine programs they want.”

But according to Jamie Gorelick a Democratic member of the 9/11 Commission and the CIA’s National Security Advisory Panel, disputes between the CIA and DIA have had less to do with turf or budget battles than with the fact that each works for a different client. The NSA, the NRO, and the NIMA, while technically part of the Pentagon, have a national mandate, but the DIA (the CIA’s closest competitor) and the military intelligence arms have traditionally focused on the sort of information that would be of interest to a military commander-troop levels or weaponry or target ocations. The CIA, on the other hand, sees itself as having a broader field of focus, taking in political and diplomatic concerns as well as military ones.

”It’s mostly the difference between tactical and strategic concerns, in a gross sense,” says Gorelick. If more of the intelligence the president reads in his daily briefing is being collected and analyzed by the Pentagon, Gorelick worries, the picture presented may be an incomplete one.

Juliette Kayyem, a counterterrorism specialist at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, also sees a fundamental difference between the military and CIA mind-set. ”It’s a sense of priorities, of what intelligence is about. We should think of intelligence being not simply preparation for the battlefield, but the whole array of intelligence activities, from reading Le Monde to checking out jihadist websites.

”Maybe before Sept. 11, we so myopically looked at state-based threats that we missed al Qaeda,” she adds. ”Now we are turning intelligence into an agent of war and military action, and we’re just as likely to miss important threats.”

Clarke, however, believes that concerns about a Pentagon takeover of intelligence are premature. Through the DIA, he points out, the Defense Department ”has been doing intelligence collection and analysis since 1961, tactical and strategic.” If it’s coordinated, he believes, there’s no reason that the Pentagon and the CIA can’t share those duties.

Mark Lowenthal, former assistant director of the CIA, puts it somewhat differently. The point, for Lowenthal, is not that CIA analysis is deeper or more valid than what’s produced at the Pentagon. It’s just different, and dependably so. With the weakening of the CIA, he says, ”The president won’t suddenly be reading situation reports of tactical engagements in Iraq.” Still, he says, it’s in no one’s interest to see the CIA weakened.

”We’ve organized our intelligence community around a few principles. One of them is competitive analysis, the idea that if you have different agencies with different points of view, you’ll have better intelligence.”

”That’s important,” he says. ”We don’t want to lose that.”

Drake Bennett is the staff writer for Ideas. E-mail [email protected].

Delays, abuses and irregularities plague Zhao Yan case

8 June 2006

Delays, abuses and irregularities plague Zhao Yan case

Reporters Without Borders has blasted abuses and irregularities on the part of prosecutors and judges in the preparation of the case against New York Times employee Zhao Yan.

On 6 June 2006, a judge of the No 2 intermediate peoples court in Beijing told his lawyer Mo Shaoping that it had decided to adjourn the journalists case yet again. It should have opened today.

“Now, we have seen everything in this case: secret detention, lies and silence on the part of the authorities, failure to respect legal timescales and irregularities,” said the press freedom organisation.

The dropping of all charges and the release of Zhao Yan, laureate of the 2005 Reporters Without Borders press freedom prize, remains the only fair and reasonable outcome of this case,” it said.

“We particularly condemn the attitude of the prosecutors, who despite the absence of any concrete proof, continue to accuse the journalist of fraud and divulging state secrets. We are also concerned that in the past journalists and dissidents have received heavy sentences from the No 2 Intermediate peoples court in Beijing for offences of opinion.

Some procedures undertaken by this court have been ruled as contrary to international standards by UN experts,” it added.

Zhao Yans trial was due to open on 8 June 2006. But on 6 June, a judge announced a delay of about one month to the lawyer who had again requested for the defence witnesses to be heard. The court justified its decision by Mos request. He told Reuters that the judge had tried to put pressure on him to ask for the adjournment.

The adjournment could be linked to the absence of concrete proof in the files on the case sent to the court by State Security or by the judges failure to decide whether or not witnesses in the case should be heard.

Reporters Without Borders repeats its appeal for all witnesses, including correspondents for the New York Times, to give evidence.

The holding of the trial follows the prosecutors decision, announced on 17 April, to reopen charges and to send the file to the No 2 intermediate peoples court in Beijing. One month earlier, on 17 March, the lawyer had announced that the charges laid against his client had been lifted, on the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintaos visit to the United States. Zhao Yan, aged 44, was not however released.

The political decision to reopen the case on the basis of the same accusations is not legal since the posecutors had not produced any new documentary evidence or proof to back up the accusations of “divulging state secrets”. This was discovered by Mo Shaoping when he was given access to part of his clients “new files” at the end of May. Moreover the prosecutors and State Security both failed to observe the legal timescale.

Reporters Without Borders pointed out that in May 2004, the cyberdissident Yang Jianli was sentenced to five years in prison by the No 2 intermediate peoples court in Beijing for “espionage” and “illegally entering Chinese territory”. A group of experts from the UN termed his arrest and trial as “arbitrary and unfair”.

Zhao has been in prison since 17 September 2004, falsely accused of having revealed the political retirement of Jiang Zemin to the New York Times before the official announcement. The journalist was formally arrested on 20 October 2004 and then charged with “divulging state secrets”, a crime punishable by the death penalty, and with “fraud”.

Zhao is held in an isolation cell at the State Security detention centre in Beijing. The prison authorities refuse to allow him some of his medical treatment. His family, which has still not been allowed to visit him, has said they have been depressed by the constant twists and turns in the case. Mo Shaoping has however been allowed to visit him in May 2006.


Google.com blocked as vice tightens on Chinese Internet users

6 June 2006

Google.com blocked as vice tightens on Chinese Internet users

Reporters Without Borders today condemned the current unprecedented level of Internet filtering in China, which means the Google.com search engine can no longer be accessed in most provinces – although the censored Chinese version, Google.cn, is still accessible – and software designed in the United States to get round censorship now only works with great difficulty.

The organisation also deplored the fact that the 17th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre on 4 June has been used to tighten the vice on Chinese Internet users.

It was only to be expected that Google.com would be gradually sidelined after the censored version was launched in January, Reporters Without Borders said. Google has just definitively joined the club of western companies that comply with online censorship in China. It is deplorable that Chinese Internet users are forced to wage a technological war against censorship in order to access banned content.

Internet users in many major Chinese cities have had difficulty in connecting to the uncensored international version of Google for the past week. The search engine was totally unaccessible throughout the country on 31 May. The blocking then gradually extended to Google News and Google Mail. So the Chinese public is now reduced to using the censored Chinese versions of these services.

At the same time, the authorities have largely managed to neutralise software designed to sidestep censorship since 24 May. Such software as Dynapass, Ultrasurf, Freegate and Garden Networks is normally used by about 100,000 people in China to gain access to news and information that is blocked by the firewall isolating China from the rest of the worldwide web.

Bill Xia, the US-based exile who created Dynapass, said the jamming of these programmes had reached an unprecedented level and he was convinced the authorities were deploying considerable hardware and software resources to achieve it.

Software engineers based abroad have been trying to update these programmes on the basis of information they have received from Internet users inside China. A new version of Dynapass was released a few days ago, but its effectiveness is still extremely limited.

Cyber-dissident arrested, two others forced to leave town

2 June 2006

Cyber-dissident arrested, two others forced to leave town

Reporters Without Borders today called for the release on health grounds of cyber-dissident and human rights activist Guo Qizhen, who was arrested at his home on 12 May and whose health, according to his lawyer, is worrying.

The press freedom organisation also condemned the harassment of two other cyber-dissidents, Liu Shui and Xiong Zhongjun, who were forced by the police to leave the city where they live after regularly posting political comments on the Internet.

We have registered two arrests and two prison sentences for articles posted online since the start of the year, Reporters Without Borders said. China is by far the worlds biggest prison for cyber-dissidents, with a total of 50 of them behind bars.

The organisation added: China is getting more and more effective in its censorship of websites, blogs and online forums and poses a major threat to the development of the Internet worldwide. It has created an alternative online model, based on filtering and repression, and now has emulators among the worlds other authoritarian regimes.

Aged 45, Guo has published many articles on websites based abroad in which he has openly criticised the government. His arrest seems to be linked to his participation in a rotating hunger strike launched by lawyer Gao Zhisheng in protest against human rights violations in China. Pro-democracy activists have been taking turns to fast for 24 hours since 4 February. It was Guos turn when he was arrested.

According to his lawyer, Li Jianqiang, the authorities used Guos Internet articles as grounds for arresting him as it is not illegal to stage a hunger strike. Guo is currently being held in Cangzhou detention centre No. 2 in the central province of Hebei. Neither his family nor his lawyer have been allowed to see him.

Reached by Reporters Without Borders, Li said Guo had a broken leg and was psychologically very debilitated. He cannot walk and the detention centre where he is held lacks the resources to give him adequate treatment.

Liu was one of the leaders of the student movement in the northern region of Gansu in 1989, after which he was sent to a reeducation camp for 15 months. He then went to live in Shenzen (near Hong Kong), where he worked for several regional newspapers. After being fired for writing controversial articles, he began posting articles on the Internet. He was arrested again in May 2005 and then released, whereupon he resumed his online activities. He was arrested yet again on 29 May by the Shenzen police. When freed the following day, he was told to leave the city within 48 hours.

Xiong, 26, is a member of the Independent Chinese PEN Centre. He has posted literary criticism, poems and political essays on websites. He was evicted once already from his home as a result of pressure from the Shenzen police. He had just moved into a new apartment on 15 May when the authorities again forced the owner to evict him. Tired of the constant harassment, he has decided to leave Shenzen, the city he has lived in for the past six years.

Meanwhile, the family of blogger Hao Wu has still had virtualy no news about him. Hao was kidnapped more than three months ago by the Beijing security services.