Dr. Johnson Speaks On language, English words, and life.
by Jack Lynch
01/01/2007, Volume 012, Issue 16
Johnson on the English Language
Vol. 18, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson
Edited by Gwin J. Kolb and Robert DeMaria
Yale, 560 pp., $90
Samuel Johnson died 222 years ago, and in all that time there has been surprisingly little agreement about what he thought about many important questions.
He wrote about politics: Some see him as a diehard conservative, others as an advocate for the policies of the modern left. He wrote about empire: Some see him as a devoted imperialist, others as an enemy of imperial expansion. He wrote about economics: Some see him as a champion of modern capitalism, others as an opponent of the free market. He wrote about the sexes: Some see him as a determined misogynist, others as the most devoted feminist thinker of his day.
Why so little agreement after so many years? It’s not for lack of material. Johnson’s published writings fill dozens of volumes: A play, a few short fictions, a travel book, a stack of political pamphlets, dozens of poems, more than 50 biographies, several hundred essays, a complete annotated edition of the works of Shakespeare, and tens of thousands of definitions in his great Dictionary. And then there are the five fat volumes of his letters and, most famously, Boswell’s Life of Johnson, recording more than a thousand pages of his conversation. Perhaps no writer in English is better documented.
It’s not for lack of attention. In the years since his death, scholars have been poring over those dozens of volumes and trying to make sense of their author. Johnson has been the subject of hundreds of books and thousands of articles. Each year sees another 150 or so titles in which he is chronicled, celebrated, abused, psychoanalyzed, and deconstructed. He’s a mainstay of English literature surveys, of graduate seminars, and of professional conferences. He remains a source of fascination for both professors and journalists; he is the subject of both dissertations and books of Christian devotion.
It’s certainly not because he was hesitant to speak his mind. Johnson, famously blunt in both his writing and his conversation, loved controversy. Sugarcoating was not for him. When Boswell tried to defend a woman who cheated on her husband, Johnson would have none of it: “The woman’s a whore,” he insisted, “and there’s an end on’t.” In political disputes he could be brutal. He dismissed the rebellious American colonists as “Rascals–Robbers–Pirates,” who “ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging.” He went so far as to declare that he was “willing to love all mankind, except an American.” Even literary masterpieces didn’t escape his forceful criticism. Henry Fielding, one of England’s greatest novelists, was “a blockhead.” Paradise Lost, he said, “is one of the books which the reader admires and puts down, and forgets to take up again. None ever wished it longer than it is.” And even “Shakespeare never has six lines together without a fault.”
Why, then, does Johnson remain so elusive? The real reason is that his mind is one of the richest and most complicated of his era, perhaps of any era. It’s notoriously difficult to pin him down or to reduce him to sound bites. The subtlety and precision of his thought are both the reason people have been drawn to him for so many years and the reason they disagree even after all that careful reading. To pigeonhole him as “liberal” or”conservative,” “imperialist” or “anti-imperialist,” forces us to be very clear about what we mean by those words, because he’s almost always too complicated to fit neatly into any of our categories.
The English language is where Johnson did some of his most important work, and debates about the significance of that work continue to this day. His famous Dictionary of the English Language appeared in two huge volumes in 1755. Contrary to the popular myth, it was not the first English dictionary–Johnson had dozens of predecessors in English-language lexicography. In fact, he had few big ideas that can be called original, in his Dictionary or elsewhere. There’s no Johnsonian theorem, no Johnsonian method, no Johnsonian discovery. As a poet he didn’t invent a Johnsonian stanza; as a political writer he didn’t develop a Johnsonian system. His friend Adam Smith laid the foundations for modern economic thought; his enemy David Hume turned philosophy on its head; his acquaintance Benjamin Franklin was one of the most prolific inventors in history. Johnson, on the other hand, wasn’t a “first” in anything important, including his Dictionary.
As two scholars put it 50 years ago, “Johnson, as lexicographer, asked no questions, gave no answers, and invented no techniques which were new to Europe.”
What’s important about Johnson’s Dictionary isn’t that it was the first, but that it was the best dictionary of its day, the most discerning and precise that had ever appeared, the one that gave more attention than ever before to teasing out minute discriminations of meaning. The earliest dictionaries covered only the “hard words”–terms like adpugn (fight against), aconick (poisonous), and abligurition (spending too much on food and drink). Consider Robert Cawdrey, whose Table Alphabeticall of 1604 deserves to be called the first English dictionary. He includes words like calcinate (“to make salt”), calygraphie (“fayre writing”), and calliditie (“craftines, or deceit”) but can’t be bothered with call, cat, or catch. While he defines taciturnitie (“silence or keeping counsaile”) and tangible (“that may be touched”), he skips over a familiar word like take.
Other early dictionaries did the same. Edward Phillips’s dictionary, A New World of Words, jumps from tainct to takel, Thomas Blount’s Glossographia goes straight from tainct to talaries. Seventeenth-century lexicographers didn’t see the point of defining words like cat or take. And the definitions they included were usually very limited. Here are some complete entries from Cawdrey’s dictionary:
distance, space betweene.
division, parting or seperating.
dulcimur, instrument.
efficient, working, or accomplishing.
election, choice.
And so on. Cawdrey’s definitions were usually no more than synonyms, and not very precise ones at that. To be told a dulcimer is an instrument is of very little help. Is it a musical instrument? a scientific instrument? a legal instrument? If a musical instrument, do you blow on it, bang on it, or pluck its strings? Cawdrey doesn’t say.
In the 18th century, lexicographers began paying more attention to common words. It’s a development that shows a new degree of sophistication coming to the study of the language. John Kersey’s New English Dictionary, for instance, appeared in 1702; it defines take this way: “to hold with one’s Hand, to lay hold of”–a total of nine words. Benjamin Martin, the first English lexicographer to use numbered senses, covers 17 different senses of take in a total of 132 words. Nathan Bailey, Johnson’s most important precursor, gave common English words more attention than ost of his predecessors, but even he dispensed with all of his definitions of take in a mere 362 words.
Now turn to Johnson’s Dictionary. His entries for take, with 133 numbered senses and 363 quotations, run to more than 8,000 words. He’s careful to distinguish taking medicine from taking revenge, taking one’s way from taking one’s time. And his definitions are more precise than those of any of his predecessors. Many people think the hardest words to define are the obscure ones–words like ruderary or fabaceous or anatiferous. (For the curious: ruderary means “belonging to rubbish”; fabaceous means “having the nature of a bean”; anatiferous means “producing ducks.”) But these inkhorn terms are in fact some of the easiest ones to define, because once you figure out the Latin or Greek roots, you’ve got your answer. But defining a word like take or get or set is a real challenge. No one had ever really attempted to solve these problems before Johnson, whose powerful intelligence qualified him to sort through all the subtle differences in senses.
The experience he gained from being a careful practical lexicographer also gave him insight into how language works in general, and his comments on language show a sensitivity that was unparalleled in his day, and has few rivals in our own. One of the perennial debates among people who discuss the language is whether it is the job of commentators to be prescriptive or descriptive. The prescriptivists tell you the way the language should be; the descriptivists tell you the way it is.
The prescriptivists warn against splitting infinitives and insist that it’s wrong to end sentences with prepositions; the descriptivists say such rules are artificial and old-fashioned, and a linguist should care only about the way real people speak and write. The two sides glower at each other across the pages of scholarly journals and editorial pages: The prescriptivists see themselves as champions of standards of propriety and their opponents as wild-eyed linguistic anarchists; the descriptivists see themselves as realists and their opponents as inflexible linguistic authoritarians. And many on both sides are eager to claim the authority of Johnson, the first great theorist of the English language, to support their cause.
So which camp is Johnson’s? It should be no surprise that there’s no consensus. Those who claim Johnson was a prescriptivist point to entries in his Dictionary like ruse, which Johnson says is “A French word neither elegant nor necessary,” or scomm, “A word out of use, and unworthy of revival.” The word thro’ was “Contracted by barbarians from through,” and disannul should “be rejected as ungrammatical and barbarous.” Here Johnson seems to be delivering edicts, issuing verdicts on whether words should live or die.
Those who see him as a pioneer descriptivist, on the other hand, point to passages in the Dictionary like this: “It is not in our power to have recourse to any established laws of speech, but we must remark how the writers of former ages have used the same word”–in other words, the only guide to language is usage, not logic, not rules. He wrote that his job was not to “form, but register the language,” not to “teach men how they should think, but relate how they have hitherto expressed their thoughts.”
The only way to settle this question is through careful attention to Johnson’s Dictionary, his great monument to the English language. Reading the entire work from cover to cover, though, is the work of months, even years. Johnson defines some 43,000 words, illustrating those words with around 115,000 quotations from great English authors, in a book that stretches to roughly three million words of text.
To put that in perspectie, Moby-Dick, War and Peace, and the collected works of Shakespeare combined are just over half the length of Johnson’s Dictionary. But if it’s impractical to read the entire Dictionary, it’s possible to read some of Johnson’s most important theoretical statements about the nature of the English language. And the appearance of this definitive edition of Johnson’s writings about the English language is a good opportunity to look at these questions anew.
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson has been underway since the mid-1950s, and after half a century is finally nearing completion. When finished, it will be the first collected edition of Johnson’s works since 1825; already it’s a major scholarly achievement. Not all of the volumes, of course, are of equal interest outside the academy. Volume 17, for instance, is Johnson’s translation of Jean Pierre de Crousaz’s Commentaire sur la traduction en vers de M. Abbé Du Resnel, de l’Essai de M. Pope sur l’homme–hardly a title to make its way onto any bestseller list. But Johnson on the English Language (Vol. 18) deserves serious attention from a wide readership.
Even parts of this volume, it must be admitted, will be of interest mainly to specialists. The editors–Robert DeMaria, one of the most distinguished experts on Johnson, and the recently deceased Gwin J. Kolb, whose contributions to Johnsonian studies go back more than half-a-century–know Johnson’s works and their contexts intimately. They trace many of his arguments to now-obscure 17th-century French and Italian linguists, and they spot Johnson’s occasional lapses when he transcribes Anglo-Saxon. Things like this are useful to specialists but not to general readers. And even some of Johnson’s own writings here–his “History of the English Language” and his “Grammar of the English Tongue”–will be rough going for all but the most devoted readers.
But while Johnson was a serious scholar, and while he has been well served by two more serious scholars, he wasn’t writing only for other academics. Johnson once said he “rejoice[d] to concur with the common reader,” and this “common reader . . . uncorrupted with literary prejudices,” was his ideal audience. Johnson has a reputation for being a difficult, even a forbidding, writer; but he could be admirably direct and powerful when he chose to be. And some of his best writing appears in the Dictionary and in Johnson on the English Language, especially the preface to his Dictionary and the drafts of the earlier Plan of an English Dictionary that mapped his territory before setting out.
The preface opens with his gloomy survey of the prospect before him:
It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employments of life, to be rather driven by the fear of evil, than attracted by the prospect of good; to be exposed to censure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by miscarriage, or punished for neglect, where success would have been without applause, and diligence without reward.
Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries; whom mankind have considered, not as the pupil, but the slave of science, the pionier of literature, doomed only to remove rubbish and clear obstructions from the paths of Learning and Genius, who press forward to conquest and glory, without bestowing a smile on the humble drudge that facilitates their progress. Every other authour may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach, and even this negative recompence has been yet granted to very few.
And yet this “humble drudge” went on to summarize both the state of the language and the nature of his work. It’s clear that he had prescriptive intentions at the beginning of his labors: “When I took the first survey of my undertaking, I found our speech copious without order, and energetick wthout rules: wherever I turned my view, there was perplexity to be disentangled, and confusion to be regulated.” He then described in detail how he proceeded, beginning with “the perusal of our writers”–Johnson read many hundreds of works of English literature, marking them up as he went–and noting along the way “whatever might be of use to ascertain or illustrate any word or phrase.”
He recounted his efforts to reduce the notoriously inconsistent spelling of English words to something like a logical system. He wrestled with the relationships between words and their roots. He considered the blend of Germanic and Latinate words that make up English.
Not everything came out the way he had hoped. “I laboured to settle the orthography, display the analogy, regulate the structures, and ascertain the signification of English words, to perform all the parts of a faithful lexicographer,” he admitted, “but I have not always executed my own scheme, or satisfied my own expectations.” He wanted to show for each word “by what gradations of intermediate sense it has passed from its primitive to its remote and accidental signification,” but found this plan was “not always practicable” because “kindred senses may be so interwoven, that the perplexity cannot be disentangled, nor any reason be assigned why one should be ranged before the other.”
He also recognized that many of his suggestions would do little good. Besides, any proposed change to the language is bound to cause inconvenience. “It has been asserted,” he wrote, “that for the law to be known, is of more importance than to be right. Change, says Hooker, is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.” His conclusion was glum: “The English Dictionary was written with little assistance of the learned, and without any patronage of the great; not in the soft obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of academick bowers, but amidst inconvenience and distraction, in sickness and in sorrow. . . . I have protracted my work till most of those whom I wished to please, have sunk into the grave, and success and miscarriage are empty sounds: I therefore dismiss it with frigid tranquillity, having little to fear or hope from censure or from praise.”
And yet, for all its failures, Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language remains tremendously insightful and influential, perhaps the only reference work that’s also a classic of English literature. So what did Johnson think about prescription versus description? Was his Dictionary fundamentally conservative or progressive?
People on all sides have the bad habit of attributing beliefs to Johnson that he never held. To his supporters, he’s the embodiment of their own convictions; to his detractors, he’s the embodiment of everything they despise. That may be inevitable. But the real Samuel Johnson–whether prescriptive or descriptive, whether conservative or liberal–will be found only in the pages of his works. Those works are still eminently readable, and now his writings on language are available in a more authoritative form than ever before. For anyone interested in the language, Johnson on the English Language will more than repay the time it takes to read.
Jack Lynch is associate professor of English at Rutgers. His edition of selections from Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary has just been issued in paperback.
Why Hawks Win
By Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Renshon
Why are hawks so influential? The answer may lie deep in the human mind. People have dozens of decision-making biases, and almost all favor conflict rather than concession. A look at why the tough guys win more than they should.
Elizabeth Glassanos/FOREIGN POLICYShould Hawks Win? Matthew Continetti of the conservative Weekly Standard and Matthew Yglesias of the liberal American Prospect square off in an FP web exclusive debate.National leaders get all sorts of advice in times of tension and conflict. But often the competing counsel can be broken down into two basic categories. On one side are the hawks: They tend to favor coercive action, are more willing to use military force, and are more likely to doubt the value of offering concessions. When they look at adversaries overseas, they often see unremittingly hostile regimes who only understand the language of force. On the other side are the doves, skeptical about the usefulness of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions. Where hawks see little in their adversaries but hostility, doves often point to subtle openings for dialogue.
As the hawks and doves thrust and parry, one hopes that the decision makers will hear their arguments on the merits and weigh them judiciously before choosing a course of action. Dont count on it. Modern psychology suggests that policymakers come to the debate predisposed to believe their hawkish advisors more than the doves. There are numerous reasons for the burden of persuasion that doves carry, and some of them have nothing to do with politics or strategy. In fact, a bias in favor of hawkish beliefs and preferences is built into the fabric of the human mind.
Social and cognitive psychologists have identified a number of predictable errors (psychologists call them biases) in the ways that humans judge situations and evaluate risks. Biases have been documented both in the laboratory and in the real world, mostly in situations that have no connection to international politics. For example, people are prone to exaggerating their strengths: About 80 percent of us believe that our driving skills are better than average. In situations of potential conflict, the same optimistic bias makes politicians and generals receptive to advisors who offer highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of war. Such a predisposition, often shared by leaders on both sides of a conflict, is likely to produce a disaster. And this is not an isolated example.
In fact, when we constructed a list of the biases uncovered in 40 years of psychological research, we were startled by what we found: All the biases in our list favor hawks. These psychological impulsesonly a few of which we discuss hereincline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations. In short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.
None of this means that hawks are always wrong. One need only recall the debates between British hawks and doves before World War II to remember that doves can easily find themselves on the wrong side of history. More generally, there are some strong arguments for deliberately instituting a hawkish bias. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to demand far more than a 50-50 chance of being right before we accept the promises of a dangerous aversary. The biases that we have examined, however, operate over and beyond such rules of prudence and are not the product of thoughtful consideration. Our conclusion is not that hawkish advisors are necessarily wrong, only that they are likely to be more persuasive than they deserve to be.
VISION PROBLEMS
Several well-known laboratory demonstrations have examined the way people assess their adversarys intelligence, willingness to negotiate, and hostility, as well as the way they view their own position. The results are sobering. Even when people are aware of the context and possible constraints on another partys behavior, they often do not factor it in when assessing the other sides motives. Yet, people still assume that outside observers grasp the constraints on their own behavior. With armies on high alert, its an instinct that leaders can ill afford to ignore.
Imagine, for example, that you have been placed in a room and asked to watch a series of student speeches on the policies of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. Youve been told in advance that the students were assigned the task of either attacking or supporting Chávez and had no choice in the matter. Now, suppose that you are then asked to assess the political leanings of these students. Shrewd observers, of course, would factor in the context and adjust their assessments accordingly. A student who gave an enthusiastic pro-Chávez speech was merely doing what she was told, not revealing anything about her true attitudes. In fact, many experiments suggest that people would overwhelmingly rate the pro-Chávez speakers as more leftist. Even when alerted to context that should affect their judgment, people tend to ignore it. Instead, they attribute the behavior they see to the persons nature, character, or persistent motives. This bias is so robust and common that social psychologists have given it a lofty title: They call it the fundamental attribution error.
The effect of this failure in conflict situations can be pernicious. A policymaker or diplomat involved in a tense exchange with a foreign government is likely to observe a great deal of hostile behavior by that countrys representatives. Some of that behavior may indeed be the result of deep hostility. But some of it is simply a response to the current situation as it is perceived by the other side. What is ironic is that individuals who attribute others behavior to deep hostility are quite likely to explain away their own behavior as a result of being pushed into a corner by an adversary. The tendency of both sides of a dispute to view themselves as reacting to the others provocative behavior is a familiar feature of marital quarrels, and it is found as well in international conflicts. During the run-up to World War I, the leaders of every one of the nations that would soon be at war perceived themselves as significantly less hostile than their adversaries.
If people are often poorly equipped to explain the behavior of their adversaries, they are also bad at understanding how they appear to others. This bias can manifest itself at critical stages in international crises, when signals are rarely as clear as diplomats and generals believe them to be. Consider the Korean War, just one example of how misperception and a failure to appreciate an adversarys assessment of intentions can lead to hawkish outcomes. In October 1950, as coalition forces were moving rapidly up the Korean Peninsula, policymakers in Washington were debating how far to advance and attempting to predict Chinas response. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was convinced that no possible shred of evidence could have existed in the minds of the Chinese Communists about the non-threatening intentions of the forces of the United Nations. Because U.S. leaders knew tat their intentions toward China were not hostile, they assumed that the Chinese knew this as well. Washington was, therefore, incapable of interpreting the Chinese intervention as a reaction to a threat. Instead, the Americans interpreted the Chinese reaction as an expression of fundamental hostility toward the United States. Some historians now believe that Chinese leaders may in fact have seen advancing Allied forces as a threat to their regime.
CARELESSLY OPTIMISTIC
Excessive optimism is one of the most significant biases that psychologists have identified. Psychological research has shown that a large majority of people believe themselves to be smarter, more attractive, and more talented than average, and they commonly overestimate their future success. People are also prone to an illusion of control : They consistently exaggerate the amount of control they have over outcomes that are important to themeven when the outcomes are in fact random or determined by other forces. It is not difficult to see that this error may have led American policymakers astray as they laid the groundwork for the ongoing war in Iraq.
Indeed, the optimistic bias and the illusion of control are particularly rampant in the run-up to conflict. A hawks preference for military action over diplomatic measures is often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly. Predictions that the Iraq war would be a cakewalk, offered up by some supporters of that conflict, are just the latest in a long string of bad hawkish predictions. After all, Washington elites treated the first major battle of the Civil War as a social outing, so sure were they that federal troops would rout rebel forces. General Noel de Castelnau, chief of staff for the French Army at the outset of World War I, declared, Give me 700,000 men and I will conquer Europe. In fact, almost every decision maker involved in what would become the most destructive war in history up to that point predicted not only victory for his side, but a relatively quick and easy victory. These delusions and exaggerations cannot be explained away as a product of incomplete or incorrect information. Optimistic generals will be found, usually on both sides, before the beginning of every military conflict.
If optimism is the order of the day when it comes to assessing ones own chances in armed conflict, however, gloom usually prevails when evaluating another sides concessions. Psychologically, we are receptive not only to hawks arguments for war but also to their case against negotiated solutions. The intuition that something is worth less simply because the other side has offered it is referred to in academic circles as reactive devaluation. The very fact that a concession is offered by somebody perceived as hostile undermines the content of the proposal. What was said matters less than who said it. And so, for example, American policymakers would likely look very skeptically on any concessions made by the regime in Tehran. Some of that skepticism could be the rational product of past experience, but some of it may also result from unconsciousand not necessarily rationaldevaluation.
Evidence suggests that this bias is a significant stumbling block in negotiations between adversaries. In one experiment, Israeli Jews evaluated an actual Israeli-authored peace plan less favorably when it was attributed to the Palestinians than when it was attributed to their own government. Pro-Israel Americans saw a hypothetical peace proposal as biased in favor of Palestinians when authorship was attributed to Palestinians, but as evenhanded when they were told it was authored by Israelis.
DOUBLE OR NOTHING
It is apparent that hawks often ave the upper hand as decision makers wrestle with questions of war and peace. And those advantages do not disappear as soon as the first bullets have flown. As the strategic calculus shifts to territory won or lost and casualties suffered, a new idiosyncrasy in human decision making appears: our deep-seated aversion to cutting our losses. Imagine, for example, the choice between:
Option A: A sure loss of $890
Option B: A 90 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 10 percent chance to lose nothing.
In this situation, a large majority of decision makers will prefer the gamble in Option B, even though the other choice is statistically superior. People prefer to avoid a certain loss in favor of a potential loss, even if they risk losing significantly more. When things are going badly in a conflict, the aversion to cutting ones losses, often compounded by wishful thinking, is likely to dominate the calculus of the losing side. This brew of psychological factors tends to cause conflicts to endure long beyond the point where a reasonable observer would see the outcome as a near certainty. Many other factors pull in the same direction, notably the fact that for the leaders who have led their nation to the brink of defeat, the consequences of giving up will usually not be worse if the conflict is prolonged, even if they are worse for the citizens they lead.
U.S. policymakers faced this dilemma at many points in Vietnam and today in Iraq. To withdraw now is to accept a sure loss, and that option is deeply unattractive. The option of hanging on will therefore be relatively attractive, even if the chances of success are small and the cost of delaying failure is high.
Hawks, of course, can cite many moments in recent history when adversaries actually were unremittingly hostile and when force produced the desired result or should have been applied much earlier. The clear evidence of a psychological bias in favor of aggressive outcomes cannot decide the perennial debates between the hawks and the doves. It wont point the international community in a clear direction on Iran or North Korea. But understanding the biases that most of us harbor can at least help ensure that the hawks dont win more arguments than they should.
Daniel Kahneman is a Nobel laureate in economics and Eugene Higgins professor of psychology and professor of public affairs at Princeton Universitys Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
Jonathan Renshon is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Harvard University and author of Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006).
中国没有明天！（连载之一）
黄河清
卷首语
五千年文明传承，两千年封建延续，57年人性泯灭沉沦堕落、生态环
境濒临全面崩溃。山颓木坏，陆沉鱼烂，神州已逞末日景象，中国没
有明天！
自序
第一章 铁打的营盘流水的兵
第二章 制度杀人惨有迹
第三章 文化戕心寓无形
第四章 忍系胆汁甘如饴
第五章 忠融骨髓化入血
第六章 谎绝惨绝无耻绝
第七章 懦怯大行刚勇无
第八章 地狱煎熬也幽默
第九章 最后神器堕落尽
第十章 共产党万税
第十一章 毛主席万岁
第十二章 孩子已经没明天
第十三章 东西文化对照录
第十四章 李熬演讲荣辱谈
第十五章 毛将焉附与独立人格
第十六章 异数文化的悲哀
第十七章 不是不见及此，而是就要逆此！
第十八章 乱象纷呈碾碎一切
第十九章 文化秩序重建无望
第二十章 生态环境全面崩溃
第二十一章 明天，你在哪里？
附记
自序
制度、文化两者的关系是老题目，论者滥矣；但将两者与人性联系起
来探究，则不多见。笔者一试，期见新意。书名《中国没有明天》，
非故作惊人之语，乃无可奈何之实。末日景象屡现，歌舞升平愈盛，
本历史回光返照之陈迹。皇帝新衣既幻，孩子真话是实。笔者不过临
死之前，回复童真童趣以过把久违了的真瘾罢了。
本书各章联为一个整体，总括论述制度、文化和人性三者的关系；每
章又可以独立成篇，用以说明各章标题所示的问题。
写法上尽量避免此类文章必然的刻板、枯燥、理论化，力求多用史
实、事例有意味地具体地也必然是沉重地讲述所要说明的意思。希望
能给读者耳目一新、有兴趣读完的感觉。然意存高远，笔难从心，眼
高手低，病亦深矣。未能尽如人意，但求无愧我心。
所有引文，皆有出处，不作详注，为求简洁，避免冗沓，且本书非学
术专著也。
中国明天之有无，历史将证实。
（2006年7月～11月于地中海畔）
第一章 铁打的营盘流水的兵
制度是营盘，朝代是流水，皇帝是兵！
这营盘、流水、兵的辩证关系是中华民族两千余年历史的铁则。
黄虞尧舜禹，已难以确切稽考；商周，史迹凿凿；春秋战国秦后，则
有浩如烟海的典籍、文物作了准确的记录。从秦始皇嬴政到清宣统溥
仪，中国有几百位皇帝。溥仪逊位，名义上没有了皇帝，事实上还是
存在，袁世凯、张勋且不论；蒋介石，是准皇帝；毛泽东，是大皇
帝，集大成的大皇帝，集皇权和教主于一身，集秦始皇和孔夫子于一
体的“伟大的导师、伟大的领袖、伟大的统帅、伟大的舵手”。
做这个营盘里的兵是许多人的梦想。最早也最典型最传统最概括的例
子是三个人的豪言壮语。贵族项羽说：“彼可取而代之！”小吏刘邦
说：“大丈夫当如是也！”农夫陈胜说：“王侯将相宁有种乎？”秦
皇汉武、唐宗宋祖、成吉思汗、朱明康熙……这些兵们，无过于这三
种形态。他们在制度的营盘里翻江倒海、纵横驰骋，成就了一代代、
一桩桩丰功伟业，在两千余年的历史长河里演出了无数威武雄壮的活
剧。其中，赞襄最力，最功不可没的是孔子和他的徒子徒孙。孔子的
智慧、孔学的理念、孔门的才华不断地修缮、美化这个营盘，似滔滔
不绝的流水冲刷浸润的这个营盘日臻渐完善、成熟以至美伦美奂、坚
不可摧。因此，代表并见证着这个营盘的文化──中华民族的历朝历
代，无论如何更替，都能傲然于世，屹立不倒！
两汉、魏晋、大唐、南北宋、元、明、清，无论是烂汉、脏唐、懦弱
称臣的南宋儿皇帝、屠戮功臣的朱元璋、外来的游牧部落蒙古与女
真，一旦进入这营盘，无不为流水所清洗所浸润所滋养，大体上清洁
光鲜起来、温文尔雅起来。
小吏出身的汉高祖，逃命时把儿子推下车，对垒时不顾父亲死活的无
赖刘邦，当上了开国皇帝，执掌了营盘后，流水就开始将他的流氓习
气清除，那首著名的“大风歌”留下了他的帝王气象：“大风起兮云
飞扬，威加海内兮归故乡。安得猛士兮守四方！”
创大唐盛世的唐太宗李世民，黄袍加身玩弄权术开有宋一朝的赵匡
胤、其不肖子孙让南宋王朝的子民苟安了150余年的赵构，寺庙里跑
出来的野和尚明太祖朱元璋，都为营盘所陶范所制约，成就了一代代
勋功伟业。一代天骄开拓疆土至贝加尔湖的成吉思汗，野性未改的努
尔哈赤，平三藩收台湾定一统的清圣祖玄烨，都被流水所清洗所浸润
所滋养而名垂青史。特别是玄烨的康熙朝，崇尚儒学，尤重朱熹理
学，亲临曲阜拜谒孔庙，举办博学鸿儒科，编辑出版《康熙字典》、
《古今图书集成》。种种举措，奠定了清王朝完全纳入汉文化的基
调。可以说，历朝历代的营盘、流水、兵的法则在清王朝同样得到了
体现和实施。
延至当代，毛泽东横空出世，事情才开始发生变化。毛泽东背离了历
朝历代的流水铁则，将外来文化、而且是最坏最无人性的外来文化引
了进来，硬揉进营盘中；因为毛泽东旷世奇才，这种硬揉非常到位、
非常成功！
上世纪初的新文化运动，伴随着“5．4”的狂飚而成了一场历史的误
会。温和而沉潜的德先生和赛先生来到中国匆匆一瞥，很快就被列宁
“10月革命”激扬激荡激烈的暴力至上排斥打击的奄奄一息。毛泽东
奉列宁主义为圭臬，唯苏维埃马首是瞻，搅乱天下，乱中夺权，乱中
取胜。这一股浊流汹涌澎湃，红浪滔天，淹没了神州大地。
如果说，毛泽东是“始作俑者”，那么，应该是“其无后乎！”遗憾
的是，他有后。更遗憾的是，毛泽东是作俑的大师、是斑斓虎豹，他
的后是庸匠、是画虎不成反类犬、是装腔作势媚俗猫、是猥琐不堪鼠
窃辈。
毛泽东逼死刘少奇后选的接班人是上海滩上的暴发户王洪文。这位所
谓读过书、当过兵、做过工的全才，其业余爱好是下陆战棋和玻璃球
跳棋。王洪文实在上不了台盘，再选了一位华国锋。这位英名领袖上
台后的第一举措，是派遣解放军的工兵部队在一夜之间将北京东西十
里长安大街两侧已成荫的法国梧桐连根拔起，换上了挺拔钻天白杨新
树种，以示新王朝的开始，万象更新；然后在《人民日报》上发表稚
拙可爱的书法作品：大跃进时代的一首民歌，“高山顶上修条河，河
水哗哗笑山坡。昔日在你脚下走，今日从你头上过。”以彰登基、得
志、俯视、快意恩仇的欣喜。
太小家子气的华国锋很快被老谋深算的邓小平赶下了台。这位邓小
平，确有过人之才。毛泽东曾对梁漱溟称赞邓下平“这是一把好手，
军事、政治，样样来得！”周恩来私下与薄一波臧否人物时，称刘伯
承细心谨慎，凡事“举轻若重”，誉邓小平大处着眼，凡事“举重若
轻”。可惜，这位邓小平举重若轻过了线，玩坦克机枪如儿戏，屠学
生、杀平民。此后，国防军与警察一起武装保卫贪污腐败。虎豹吃饱
了也就走开，豺狼则贪得无厌。当今豺狼般的贪墨正是邓小平的丰功
伟绩。
至于江泽民、李鹏、胡锦涛之属，荒腔走板、守成不足，等而下之不
入流了。
皇帝兵坐掌营盘，举手投足，自然有帝王气象，行事规矩，两千年一
以贯之。虎豹踹营，则无法无天；犬猫鼠辈小家子气，在营盘里乱窜
乱爬、乱叼乱咬、乱搬乱放，遂致一塌糊涂。毛泽东及其后，一27
年，一30年，一共才短短57年，两千年封建制度铁打的营盘就被破坏
的支离破碎、惨不忍睹、不可收拾。铁打的营盘快要融化，将要坍
塌！
第二章 制度杀人惨有迹
两千年的中国史，两千年的中国政权更替史就是杀人的历史。同世界
各国的战争历史一样，那种杀人的残酷野蛮，人类已有定论。无须再
论。
◇本章议论的是取得天下后的政权杀人！
◇本章说的是以公理、正义杀人！
◇本章说的是以法律杀人！
◇本章说的是国家特地用纳税人的钱豢养着的刽子手堂而皇之在大庭
广众光天化日之下公开地合法地稳妥地杀人！
为了维持政权，要杀人，历朝历代皆然，无可非议；杀法残忍、惨
酷，砍头、腰斩、寸磔、车裂、灭满门、诛九族，虽令人毛骨悚然，
回复到当时的历史背景，也能理解。但犯人死之前让吃一顿饱饭好
饭；让同亲人话别；临刑前任其或颓然软瘫、或认罪忏悔、或喊冤叫
屈、或呼天抢地、或诅咒詈骂、或豪言壮语、或视死如归……满足可
以满足的愿望的人性天则也是历朝历代皆然、固然。
◇窦娥死前立下三誓，其中一誓是背后竖一匹白练，若冤，颈血溅到
白练上，杀人者照办了。
◇阿Ｑ砍头前能唱“手执钢鞭将你打”，大喊“二十年后又是一条好
汉”。
如果说这是文学作品里的描写，当不得真，那么：
◇商鞅车裂，李斯弃市史有记载，死前都让说话的。
◇清末谭嗣同狱中赋诗：“我自横刀向天笑，去留肝胆两昆仑”；临
刑绝笔：“有心杀贼，无力回天！”
◇鉴湖女侠秋瑾留下了千古绝唱：“秋风秋雨愁煞人”。
◇共产党领袖瞿秋白被国民党将军宋希濂枪毙时未被捆绑，从容步
行，唱着国际歌挨了一枪。
◇最为史家所称道的魏晋竹林七贤的嵇康嵇中散，据《晋书》载，嵇
康被判死刑后三千太学生向司马昭要求拜嵇为师；《世说新语》
载：嵇中散临刑东市，神气不变，索琴弹之，奏《广陵》。曲终
曰：“袁孝尼尝请学此散，吾靳固不与，‘广陵散’从此绝矣！”
嵇康赴死的从容显示了人的尊严。嵇康的从容，反衬了司马昭的器
度；司马昭的器度，成就了嵇康的从容。若说杀人也有文明，这就是
了。杀你，是利害攸关，性命攸关，政权攸关，你死我活，成者王侯
败者寇。辛亥元老陶成章祭秋瑾文就说过：“谋人国不成者，死。”
没话说。但因为同是人类，这死法就有异于野兽，打输了咬死吃掉就
完。人性的天则表明了人类文明的进步在死法上有别于动物世界的野
兽法则。
鲁迅在上世纪的30年代，目睹了学生和同辈的死亡后，对国民党政府
残杀死囚、对死囚的心态有很深刻的揭示与剖析：
“……给死囚在临刑前可以当众说话，倒是‘成功的帝王’的恩
惠，也是他自信还有力量的证据，所以他有胆放死囚开口，给他
在临死之前，得到一个自夸的陶醉，大家也明白他的收场。我先
前只以为‘残酷’，还不是确切的判断。其中是含有一点恩惠
的。我每当朋友或学生的死，倘不知时日，不知地点，不知死
法，总比知道的更悲哀和不安；由此推想那一边，在暗室中毕命
于几个屠夫的手里，也一定比当众而死的更寂寞。
“然而‘成功的帝王’是不秘密杀人的，……到得就要失败了，
……这才加到第三件：秘密的杀人。……这时街道文明了，民众
安静了，但我们试一推测死者的心，却一定比明明白白而死的更
加惨苦。我先前读但丁的《神曲》，到《地狱》篇，就惊异于这
作者设想的残酷，但到现在，阅历加多，才知道他还是仁厚的
了：他还没有想出一个现在已极平常的惨苦到谁也看不见的地狱
来。”
人类现在如何杀人？
西方有刽子手这一职业。中国古代有360行，就有刽子手这一行档。
京剧里全身穿红，手抱大刀片，满脸横肉的彪形大汉就是。延至现当
代的中国，反倒没有了，要杀人，临时在解放军官兵、武装警察官兵
以及狱卒中挑选。这是因为，要杀的人太多了！
“英国司法部门公开的档案显示：在20世纪上半叶，刽子手职业
在英国是一个很难得到的工作，入选者必须遵守严格的职业操守
和道德。干这行不但要求性格冷酷，还要求臂力过人，不能在行
刑时拖泥带水。必须在面临压力时技术动作不走样，必须具备优
秀的心理素质。执行死刑的时候手法利落，对犯人尽到人道职
责，是他们这一行的最大使命。至于报酬问题，在20世纪30年
代，刽子手的报酬由各地具体决定，报酬不一。英国监狱委员会
推荐的报酬标准是：刽子手执行一次死刑可获十个旧英国几尼金
币（guineas），外加一张三等车厢火车票。旧时英国货币体制
是一个几尼金币等于21个先令（shilling），一个先令等于12便
士。现在的一个英镑等于20个先令，那就意味着十个几尼金币等
于十英镑略多一点。这个报酬在当时物价情况下是相当可观的收
入。刽子手的助手在执行死刑后立即获得一英镑11先令六便士的
固定报酬。如果两个星期之后他们没有泄密，将再一次获得同等
数额的报酬。
新加坡唯一的刽子手高龄74岁的辛格最近被政府解雇。虽然他有
46年杀了850人的经验，虽然他没有徒弟，新加坡政府从此将不
得不考虑从国外引进刽子手，新加坡政府还是因辛格违背职业操
守向公众媒体暴露了身分而毅然解雇了他。”〔摘自：《博
讯》〕
当代中国，没有职业刽子手。这样杀人：
1975年4月4日，辽宁省杀女死囚张志新，几个大汉狱卒把张抬举起
来，抡了几圈，摔在地上，用一块砖垫在颈后，按住身子脑袋，一刀
割断喉管，再用一根钢管连接喉咙呼吸，然后拉去枪毙。
被割喉管后再杀死的死囚，在辽宁省张志新不是第一个，第一个是沈
阳市皇姑区某小学20岁青年教师贾某。
记者陈禹山著文揭露如此割喉管再杀死的在辽宁省有30余案例。
中共前总书记胡耀邦在批示张志新的文件的文字里透露：辽宁省行刑
前被割喉管的有28人。
1977年12月14日，江西省杀女死囚李九莲，狱卒用尖锐的竹签把李的
下颚和舌头穿在一起，然后拉到赣州西郊枪杀，抛尸荒野，不准收
埋，任其被侮辱糟蹋。
1978年4月30日，江西省杀女死囚钟海源，故意一枪不打死，然后趁
钟半死不活之际抬到准备好的车上，活取钟的肾脏。
笔者80年代初期曾在浙江省温州市任兼职律师，当时正是政府大力宣
传要法治的时候。一当事人刚满18岁的陈建平因流氓罪被判死刑，我
为其上诉，什么回音也没有。一日，市里开_洗骁大会，陈建平被拉
去抢毙了，没通知我这个辩护人，也不通知家属。他家人从另外的渠
道得知讯息，赶去刑场收尸，只捡到死者的一颗钮扣和一些头发，尸
体没有了，怎么问，都没有了。当事人曾在我最后会见他商量上诉时
嘱我让他哥哥在他游街去刑场的路上等他见一面。我想象着他在刑车
上绝望地寻找兄长的眼光和心情时，我同他一样的绝望！
在中国，1949年建立的新政权新制度以国家、公理、正义、法律、革
命的名义如此杀人！
据有关资料，57年间，从1950年的“镇反”、1951年的“土改”、
1952年的“三反五反”、1953年的“肃反”、1957年的“反右”、
1966年开始的十年文化革命、1976年的“4．5”杀戮、1989年的
“6．4”屠城、到现在，这个政权就这样杀死了一千万人以上。
如此杀人，又如何折磨人呢？
不管这人如何万恶不赦、如何该死，让吃喝拉撒睡，应该是人性的最
基本天则。当然，监狱不是家居，犯人、死囚、狱卒也不全是绅士，
背铐、脚镣、打骂，作为惩罚性的手段全球皆然，有史皆然，那是可
以理解的，也许是必要的。但在大陆的监狱里，背铐一铐几个月，家
常便饭，死囚用铆钉固定在囚床上不让动弹几个月，司空见惯。犯人
不听话而不被背铐，是稀罕；死囚不被固定，是特例。所谓不听话，
在政治犯，只是要求最起码的人权，如唱支歌、提个抗议、要求得到
尊重、不要辱及人格诸如此类的意思；所谓背铐几个月，固定几个
月，是没有一秒钟解开过的意思。正常的人很难想象这人怎么吃饭、
喝水、撒尿、拉屎、睡觉，可这人就这么过来了，千真万确，半点不
虚！有关此类事实的披露在大陆的公开出版物上、尤其在海外的互联
网上已比比皆是，无须再作抄述了。
还有一种惩罚性的小黑屋，其可怕程度凡未亲历过、亲见过的人都绝
难相信。黑屋仅容一身，只能半蹲，躺卧，不能站直，日夜无灯光，
无阳光，一日三餐从牢洞中塞进，塞饭时牢洞的一开一关是唯一的光
线。牢洞约两巴掌大。绝无放风，吃喝拉撒睡全在黑牢内。美国纽约
的刘青先生被关过这样的黑牢100多天，刘先生说：那是关狗狗都要
发疯的地方。四川重庆的邓焕武先生曾被关了七百多个日夜！四川成
都的廖亦武先生这样写道：
“一长串五花大绑的逃跑犯被解至台前……从戏台上下的群情激
昂中，我逐渐醒悟或许就在脚下，或许就在文革中挖掘的备战防
空洞里，还有若干终年不见天日的狱中之狱，那是专为逃跑及其
它严重违规者准备的墓穴，长两米，高一米，人一旦塞进去，就
只能象动物一般，保持坐、躺、趴三种姿式，且吃喝拉撒全在里
面。这样长期幽闭的结果，一个黄种人就逐步演变成白种人，骨
头枯脆，须发如霜，皮肤亮得能隐约透出血管和内脏。某司法官
员公然在会上威胁大夥：‘谁敢以身试法，成为反改造典型，政
府就将他打入小间，绝不客气。到里面去自杀吧，去挖洞逃跑
吧，没人管你。哪怕你是铁，也要沤成绿霉红锈。’‘一年半载
你可能抗得过去，三年五年你肯定报废。’监狱黄政委呷口茶继
续侃道，‘大名鼎鼎的反改造尖子某某，脱逃两次均被抓回，加
刑六年，关进小间。开始在黑暗里寻死觅活，后来就安静了。头
两年，我下地洞去看他，他犟着不吭声，可第三个春天来临之
际，他就趴下磕头求饶了。此人关了五年零七个月，成了双目失
明的活鬼。最后他摸准机会，隔栅抱住我的腿不放。出于人道主
义，我才让他起死回阳。’”〔摘自：廖亦武著《证词》，明镜
出版社出版〕
50余年来的中国大陆，在杀人、折磨人这件事上，退化到连人性的天
则也没有了。
历史上，古今中外毫无心肝、灭绝人性的人与事多如牛毛，数不胜
数，但乖离人性的天则且被视为理所当然，被形成规范、规定、制度
化，为全民所认可、所奉行、所信守，则只有20世纪后半叶的中国大
陆才出现过。
为什么如此不近情理？为什么如此灭绝人性？为什么如此乖离人性的
天则？受者无可奈何，也罢了；观者，麻木不仁的，算是不错了，绝
大多数处之泰然视为当然；施者呢，为什么竟能如此凛然、乐此不
疲、安之若素？！
似乎只能归咎于制度的恶劣、野蛮、残忍。
◇商、周时以活人做祭坛上的牺牲，以活人陪葬天子王侯；
◇汉初的皇帝刘邦老婆吕后，将情敌戚夫人砍手砍足装在瓮里放在猪
圈称为人彘；
◇罗马贵族让角斗士互砍、同狮虎搏斗取乐；
◇史前部落战争后有吃俘虏的习惯……
这一切都比现行的任何制度野蛮、残忍，也不见那时有类乎上述乖离
人性天则的记载，应该还有别的、更深层的原因。
首发民主论坛
一九九八年，达赖喇嘛访问波士顿期间，于五月九日在布兰达斯大学（Brandeis University）发表演说。会场是布兰达斯大学的体育馆，足可容纳两三千人。
前面中间一个方阵坐的是聋哑人。我很奇怪，聋哑人怎么能听演说？原来有人用哑语进行翻译。达赖喇嘛开讲后，一位女士登台，用手势表达哑语。她的动作很优美，吸引了全场的眼光。为了使远处的聋哑人看得清，她的手势很用力，好像浑身都在使劲。看样子不长的时间就累了，一连换了三个翻译。
达赖喇嘛演说的主题是《慈悲与智慧》。佛家认为，慈悲使人快乐，慈悲使人聪明。他希望在繁华世界奔波忙碌的人，常常问一问自己：“我是谁？我的内心有什么？内心的东西，有一部分要发展，有一部分要克制。”西方的人生哲学重在外求，达赖喇嘛讲授的东方人内省的方法使听众甚感兴趣。有人认为，这也许是医治现代人由于欲望过度造成心理疾患的良方。
我注意到，达赖喇嘛在大庭广众的场合只谈佛学，不谈政治。在演说之前的一个小型座谈会上，他才谈政治。
演说是下午三点开始。一点，他与波士顿地区各大学的著名教授会见和座谈。在座的三十多人，除了我，还有一位看起来也像是中国面孔，其余都是美国人。由于杨建利的争取和安排，他和魏京生、王希哲等七八位民运人士也参加了会见和座谈。（现在，建利在北京第二监狱坐牢，祝愿他平安吉祥！）
达赖喇嘛谈了大家关心的西藏问题。他从一九五〇年解放军进军西藏、签订西藏和平解放十七条协议到一九五九年出走印度达兰萨拉，叙述了历史过程。有人指责他推翻了十七条协议。他说，一九五一年西藏代表在签字之前没有取得他的同意，所以也就无所谓推翻。
不久前中国政府发表了一份西藏问题白皮书，认为西藏自古以来就是中国的一部分。由此引起另外一些人的反驳，认为西藏自古以来就不是中国的一部分。达赖喇嘛认为，公正地说，西藏有时是中国的一部分，有时不是中国的一部分，两种说法都可以找到历史的根据。汉人和藏人发生过冲突和战争，汉人打藏人，藏人打汉人，都有。唐朝的时候，吐蕃一直打到长安附近，后来又有文成公主进藏。历史上，多数时间藏人和汉人是和平友好相处的。达赖喇嘛得出一个理性的结论：“Any way，历史是历史，现实是现实。历史问题可以交给历史学家去研究，我们要解决的是现实问题。现实是西藏在中华人民共和国境内。”
如何解决现实问题？达赖喇嘛说：“我不谋求西藏独立，主张高度自治。”他从地缘政治进行分析，认为西藏不具备独立的条件；如果勉强独立，对西藏的发展和人民的福祉是不利的。留在中国境内，对西藏和中国，对藏人和汉人都是有利的。但留在中国境内，必须实行高度自治。所谓“高度自治”，就是实行真正的藏人治藏；汉人治藏就不是高度自治。他对胡耀邦的开明极为赞赏，认为胡是真正尊重藏人治藏的。一九八〇年，胡耀邦访问西藏后，调走一大批不起作用或不起好作用的汉人干部，藏人是很高兴的。胡耀邦下台，有些汉人干部居然放鞭炮庆祝，说：“藏人的后台倒了！”
最后，达赖喇嘛讲到自己的归宿。他说：“未来的西藏实行高度自治以后，我回到西藏，达赖喇嘛在历史上延续下来的职权，将移交给西藏自治政府。从八思巴时期产生的政教合一制度，应该结束了。将要走入历史的这种制度最后收场的角色，大概轮到我来扮演了。我是一个僧人，僧人的愿望是一心修炼。”
座谈时，教授们纷纷发言，赞扬达赖喇嘛关于“高度自治”的主张是一种政治智慧，也是解决西藏问题的唯一出路。有一位教授说：“但是我们也听到另一种声音：西藏流亡政府还在宣扬西藏独立。流亡西方的藏人在集会游行时，总是打出雪山师子旗，高喊西藏独立的口号。就连达赖喇嘛的哥哥嘉乐顿珠，在美国和加拿大徒步旅行，沿途也是宣传西藏独立。”达赖喇嘛马上接过来说：“他们不能代表我，我的主张是真诚的，也是坚定的。”
有一位教授说，解决西藏问题还有一个障碍，就是所谓“小西藏”和“大西藏”的问题，请达赖喇嘛发表评论。达赖喇嘛说，中国境内藏人居住的地区共有五个，除了西藏以外，青海、甘肃、四川、云南各有一个藏区。所谓“小西藏”，就是现有的西藏自治区；所谓“大西藏”，就是将五个藏区合成一个大藏区。“确有一种主张，认为解决西藏问题必须将五个藏区合而为一。我认为，这是不现实的。按照我的主张，五个藏区都实行高度自治，问题就解决了。”（1）
民运人士魏京生、王希哲也站起来发言，支持达赖喇嘛“高度自治”的主张，批评中国政府对于解决西藏问题缺乏诚意。
座谈结束，达赖喇嘛主动提出要与汉人兄弟一起照相。照相完了，他拉着我的手说：“在会上你没有说话，我们坐下来谈谈。”我们在旁边的沙发上坐下。我首先问候他的健康。前不久，他病了一场。他说，现在已经完全恢复。
他慨叹，一年比一年老了。忽然问我多大年纪。
我说：“六十六。”
他用汉语说：“你长我三年。”
我哈哈大笑，说：“你讲的是文言，白话不这么说。”
“白话怎么说？”
“白话应当说：你比我大三岁。”
达赖喇嘛用左手搔搔脑袋，一副很可爱的样子。这是达赖喇嘛特有的一个人性化的动作，没有一点“神”气。
就这样，我们用英语夹汉语、汉语夹英语交谈了二十多分钟。
达赖喇嘛要我谈谈对他提出的解决西藏问题的主张的看法。
“我完全同意几位美国教授的看法，‘高度自治’的主张表现了你的政治智慧。现在的西藏名义上是实行自治。主张‘高度自治’不过沿着同一方向前进，中国政府是没有理由反对的。”
美国教授提到，西藏流亡政府发出另一种声音，达赖喇嘛明确地说“他们不能代表我”。我说：“他们固然不能代表你，但你要说服他们，同你保持一致。否则，人们会以为，你的言论只是具有宣传价值，而西藏流亡政府的声音才是真实的政治诉求。”
我还说：“通常所说的‘西藏流亡政府’，正式的名称是 Central Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.这是你神圣的达赖喇嘛的西藏中央政府。你已经表示要结束政教合一，但暂时还是政教合一的。如果达赖喇嘛和政府发出两种声音，这就不协调了。”
达赖喇嘛说：“要说服别人是很困难的，我会尽力去做。”
后来，西藏流亡政府与达赖喇嘛采取一致的立场，并以“高度自治”的主张与中国政府进行了几轮谈判，表明达赖喇嘛的说服工作是很有成效的。
关于“小西藏”和“大西藏”的问题，达赖喇嘛认为，将五个藏区合而为一建立一个“大西藏”是不现实的。我赞同这种看法，并且补充说：“如果成为现实，可能更糟。”甘肃、四川、云南和青海的藏区并没有连成一片，将五个藏区所在的范围划为一个“大西藏”，势必把两个藏区之间大片汉人居住的地区包括进来。汉人比藏人的人口密度高得多，“大西藏”范围内的总人口，汉人就会超过藏人。一旦实行民主，选出来的领导人是汉人，怎么办？所以，建立“大西藏”恰恰不能保证藏人治藏。我的结论是：“重要的是坚持‘高度自治’的原则，不是改变自治区的边界。如果‘小西藏’和‘大西藏’的问题成为谈判的障碍，不能实现流亡藏人回归西藏家园的愿望，这是很不明智的。”达赖喇嘛点头，表示同意。
达赖喇嘛是活佛。佛教思维是超凡出世的，但他在思考政治问题时却是切合实际的。相反，有些运作政治、进行谈判的人，提出的主张在达赖喇嘛看来倒是“不现实的”。
随行人员催促达赖喇嘛，说：“时间到了。”
我们交谈时，达赖喇嘛一直握着我的手。结束谈话，才松开手，我们并肩走向会场。
达赖喇嘛和我是初次见面，不知为什么在一群人中选上我单独交谈。西藏朋友说：“达赖喇嘛和你有佛缘！”我没有任何宗教信仰，不知道什么是“佛缘”。我想，达赖喇嘛是慧眼识真人，他一眼就看出我是藏人的真诚的朋友。
过了两天，王希哲送来一张我和达赖喇嘛的照片。谈话时聚精会神，我竟没有注意到他在照相。感谢希哲，为我和达赖喇嘛留下了永恒的握手。
注：
（1）苏绍智先生的一篇文章中曾提到达赖喇嘛在别的场合讲过同样的观点：“1999年，我曾和一些朋友应达赖喇嘛之邀在华盛顿与他会见。………当时有人问道：达赖喇嘛所说的西藏，除现在的西藏自治区外，是否包括大西藏，即是否包括在青海、四川、云南的藏人居住的地区？这本是一个敏感问题，达赖喇嘛举重若轻地说：如果实现了中间道路，这些地区也可以有真正的自治，这些地区现在已经设有若干藏族自治州，藏族自治县了。”（《在达赖喇嘛健在时认真谈判和平解决西藏问题》，2003年9月24日，《新世纪》网站）
首发《争鸣》2007年1月号
