The Great Triumvirate
A review of The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World, by John OSullivan
By Carnes Lord
It is hard to believe that this highly readable tale of the Cold War’s endgame is John O’Sullivan’s first book. A British-born conservative journalist, O’Sullivan was for many years editor of National Review, and before that a policy advisor to prime minister Margaret Thatcher (and ghost author of her very fine memoir). The story of the conservative resurgence in Britain and in the United States under Thatcher and Reagan is a familiar one, but it is still important to be reminded how crucial the statesmanship of these two remarkable figures was in seeing the Cold War through to its stunning yet virtually bloodless conclusion. Pope John Paul II is perhaps a less expected presence in this tale, but what makes O’Sullivan’s account unique and gives it its effective narrative focus is the evolving set of relationships among all three figures. As is only to be expected in the case of leaders with such differing perspectives and responsibilities, these relationships were not without friction. But their collaboration proved to be more than the sum of its parts, and there can be little doubt that it contributed decisively to the Soviet imperium’s confusion and ultimate ruin.
It is remarkable enough that this unlikely trioseemingly marginal figures thought too American, too Catholic, or too conservative by their own particular establishmentsachieved in quick succession the highest office available to each of them. That they were able to impose their authority quickly and effectively is truly spectacular. It is all the more sobering to be reminded that their collaboration was almost derailed before it had fairly begun. By an uncanny coincidence, all three of these leaders were victims of assassination attempts that could easily have succeeded. Reagan was shot by the deranged John Hinckley on a Washington street in March 1981 and gravely woundedmore so than was realized at the time or by many since (his doctors helped to paint a bright face on his condition). Pope John Paul was gunned down in St. Peter’s Square in May of the same year by Mehmet Ali Agca, apparently a professional assassin who very likely had connections to the Bulgarian intelligence service, and through it to the Soviet KGB. In both instances, a few millimeters’ difference in the bullets’ trajectories would have meant death. In October 1984, a powerful bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army exploded in Brighton’s Grand Hotel where Mrs. Thatcher was attending the annual Tory Party conference; five people were killed, including a Tory M.P. and the wife of a cabinet minister. One of the rooms of the prime minister’s suite was virtually destroyed just a few minutes after she had been in it. O’Sullivan does not shy away from wondering whether a providential hand was at work in all this.
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The achievements of Reagan, Thatcher, and John Paul II cannot be appreciated except against the grim background of Western decline and demoralization in the 1970s. The American intellectual and political elite were demoralized by the crisis of “liberaldom” (O’Sullivan’s word) brought on by the 1960s’ cultural revolution, as well as by the oil price spikes of 1973 and ’79, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, and the growing Soviet menace. The author provides a withering portrait of the United States under Jimmy Carter’s “post-American” administration, with its curious combination of “missionary zeal and practical failure.” Carter congratulated the American people for overcoming their “inordinate fear of Communism” at a time when Soviet military power was at its zenith and th Soviets were on the march in the Third World, including in America’s Central American backyard. At the same time, Carter seemed disposed to blame the sour mood of Americans oppressed by gas shortages, inflation, and high interest rates on some moral failurethe “malaise” of his infamous 1979 speechon the part of the American people themselves. And the Carter Administration as a whole foundered on its inability to foresee or deal with the new threat on the horizonIslamist terrorism in the form of the American embassy employees seized in Tehran by devotees of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
In Britain the statist consensus of Labour and the old Tories, abetted by a labor movement heavily influenced by orthodox Marxism, had driven the British economy into the ground. In 1975, in preparation for a visit to the United States by Thatcher as the newly elected Tory Party leader, Henry Kissinger reportedly said to President Ford that “Britain is a tragedyit has sunk to begging, borrowing and stealing until North Sea oil comes in.” As for the Catholic Church, for the first time its standing as a stalwart adversary of international Communism seemed unsure. Parts of the Church, particularly in Latin America, had begun flirting with “liberation theology,” a Marxist perversion of Christianity that sought political power through revolutionary violence, while at the same time, the Vatican felt compelled to soften its diplomacy with the Soviet bloc in order to protect the faithful in Eastern Europe. (On top of this, the Church was weakened by internal divisions after reaffirming its teaching on artificial birth control.)
The first order of business for both Thatcher and Reagan was to fix their respective economies. For Thatcher, the key was to crush the power of the unions and privatize what was in effect a socialist economy. For Reagan, it was to curb inflation and jump-start economic activity through tax cuts. It is easy to forget the short-term pain these measures caused, especially America’s deep 1981-82 recession; unflinching political leadership was indispensable to their success in both countries. And success it was, beyond the wildest imaginings even of sympathetic economic advisors and commentatorsa 20-year boom that jolted Britain from its East German-style coma to become the fourth largest economy in the world, and in America’s case, unleashed the entrepreneurial forces that ushered in the information age and the 1990s’ stock market explosion. What’s more, as O’Sullivan rightly emphasizes, the example they set deeply influenced the economic policies of governments and parties (including Britain’s own Labour Party under Tony Blair) throughout the world, and continues to do so today.
* * *
When asked once what his vision was for the Cold War, Reagan responded: “We win, they lose.” It is still not widely understood how radically the president was willing to depart from the entrenched mainstream of American foreign policy thinking in an effort to bring down the Soviet Union and put an end to the Communist experimentan experiment he was convinced was contrary to human nature and thus fundamentally unsustainable. Reagan had a better understanding of both the strengths of his own country and the weaknesses of the Soviet adversary than did the American national security establishment (and, for that matter, many of his own advisors). He believed that Western experts grossly overestimated the size and health of the Soviet economy (he was later proved correct), while underestimating the potential of the captive nations to resist their Soviet masters. Reagan proceeded very deliberately to devise and implement a grand strategy intended to capitalize on these conditions.
In the first place, the United States launched a campaign of virtual economic warfare against the Soviet nion (perhaps not sufficiently highlighted in O’Sullivan’s account), including such measures as covert interference with Soviet efforts to steal Western technology, collusion with the Saudis to depress the price of oil (the main source of Soviet hard currency), and efforts to curtail Soviet access to Western bank loans. The massive military buildup Reagan also initiated at the outset of his administration was understood as an integral part of this strategy, forcing the Soviets to shoulder the economic burden of adding to an already unsustainable level of defense spending.
Equally important, however, were the steps Reagan took to renew ideological warfare against the East. U.S. overseas broadcasting was revitalized and ramped up, and a major initiative was launched to promote democratic institutions throughout the world. But more than that, the president took it upon himself to speak directly to the Soviet empire’s oppressed populations. Using language that had not been heard from an American president since the early Cold War, if indeed even then, he called that empire “evil” and predicted, with a fine twist of irony at the expense of the Soviet founding father, that Communism would end on the “ash heap of history.” His refusal to acknowledge the Communist system’s legitimacy, and his message of hope to the Eastern peoples, were profoundly subversive, and meant to be so. Unlike the American foreign policy establishment of the day, Reagan saw no merit in contributing to Eastern Europe’s “stability” under Soviet rule.
* * *
The beginning of the end for the Soviets was Poland. There, the rise of the Solidarity movement offered the Reagan Administration a golden opportunity to begin the “rollback” of the Iron Curtain. The fascinating question is whether the Cold War would have played out as it did without the remarkable intervention in Polish affairs in the early 1980s by Pope John Paul II, the first Polish pope. As Archbishop of Krakow over the previous two decades, John Paul (then Karol Wojtyła) had ingeniously frustrated Poland’s Soviet rulers with a carefully orchestrated “cultural resistance” that escaped retaliation while exposing the fragility of the totalitarian occupation. O’Sullivan’s detailed account of the parallel and occasionally intersecting efforts of Washington and the Vatican to nurture and protect a Polish opposition movement is the strongest part of his book.
O’Sullivan is also good on the arms control and nuclear policy issues that were so central to the U.S.-Soviet relationship in this crucial period. This is one of the few areas where policy disagreements between the United States and Britain led to personal confrontations between Reagan and Thatcher (another had to do with the American invasion of Grenada in 1983). Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism and his support for ballistic missile defense did not go down well with the prime minister or the other NATO allies, who feared they would lead to a “decoupling” of the U.S. and Western Europe and increase the latter’s vulnerability to Soviet conventional attack. O’Sullivan recounts a telling exchange during a Reagan-Thatcher meeting in July 1985. Responding to her argument that deep reductions in nuclear weapons would “expose a dramatic conventional imbalance” and thus require an expensive buildup of conventional forces, Reagan replied: “Yes, that’s exactly what I imagined.” This politically explosive comment went no further at the time. But Reagan predicted essentially what has occurred in the intervening years, as advances in conventional precision strike technologies have permitted the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to very near zero. It is also clear that Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism, dictated by a deeply felt moral conviction, was an important factor in gaining the pope’s tacit support for Amerian military policy, in spite of the vocal hostility to it by many in the Catholic hierarchy.
If anything is missing from O’Sullivan’s account, it is a sense of the tremendous obstacles Reagan faced in implementing his vision within his own government. (The book is somewhat more attentive to Thatcher’s constant struggle with the Tory “Wets.”) That mistakes were madethe Iran-Contra scandal notablyis not surprising given the factionalism and free-lancing that dogged the administration from the beginning. Some have faulted the president for not doing more to bring order to his own house. Yet Reagan had a long view, he knew his own strengths and limitations, he did what he had to do, and the rest ishistory. Along with the prime minister and the pope, this president has shaped our own world in ways we tend to take for granted, but which John O’Sullivan wants to make sure we do not forget.
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【2007年8月13日狱委讯】据中国官方媒体报道,北京市第二中级人民法院今天审理了訾北佳一案。
除被判入狱一年之外,訾北佳还被处罚金1000元人民币。
中国媒体的报道还说,訾北佳在法庭上对面临的指控供认不讳,称自己“一念之差、一时糊涂”,欺骗了电视观众。
报道还说,訾北佳的辩护律师及家属认为量刑过重,但訾北佳未当庭提出上诉请求。其辩护律师表示,将改日赴看守所与訾面谈后,再决定是否上诉。
今年7月8日,北京电视台《透明度》栏目播出了《纸做的包子》。新闻播出之后,不仅在中国引起极大反响,并被海外媒体广泛转发。
北京市公安局随后成立专案组对此进行立案侦查。经调查,此节目内容为北京电视台2007年新聘用的编辑、记者訾北佳一手策划、杜撰、编造的虚假新闻。
7月19日,北京电视台向观众表示深刻道歉。北京电视台部分高层人员遭到严肃处分,訾北佳等人则被当地公安部门刑事拘留。
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早在几年以前,我就在“关天茶舍”等网络论坛上注意到了“易大旗”这个名字。与网络上大多数芜杂粗糙的文字迥然不同,那些出自于“易大旗”手笔的文章,无不嘻笑怒骂而一针见血,逻辑推理丝丝入扣,笔端又如梁启超般“常带感情”,因此对读者极具吸引力。由于“易大旗”的文章对中国的历史与现实、文化与知识分子人格均作出了鞭辟入里的批评,故在网络上时时引起轩然大波。对其文章的评价也趋向于两极化:赞同者引以为启蒙老师,许多愤青读者正是阅读了大量“易大旗” 的文字后,摆脱了精神世界中民族主义和国家主义的毒素,而成为自由主义者;相反,对立者则将其列入所谓的“汉奸”名单之中,斥之为“民族虚无主义者”– 我本人也曾有幸与之并列在此类名单之中,这大约是我与易大旗的第一次“神交”吧。
后来,我才知道“易大旗”原来是小说家孔捷生的笔名。由“孔捷生”成为“易大旗”,在上个世纪八十年代成名的那一批著名的小说家中,其人生轨迹堪称一个罕见的例外。上个世纪八十年代是文学是黄金时代,当然在这个黄金时代里也不乏诸多色彩斑斓的肥皂泡。小说和报告文学是这个时代最受追捧的文体,一个中短篇就可以让一名作家一举成名。孔捷生在那批小说家中虽然不是最有知名度和最受读者欢迎的人物,却是最有特色和潜力的作家之一。
一九八九年的天安门屠杀,使得当代中国的历史轨迹以及当代中国文学的发展都发生了翻天覆地的变化。天安门屠杀之后,大部分作家都留在了国内,经过反复的检讨和重新的效忠,“过了关”的那部分人继续拥有“带着镣铐跳舞”的“写作的自由”。在九十年代来势迅猛的商业化浪潮之中,他们先是不知所措,然后迅速地参与其中,一瞬间便完成了由“理想主义文学”到“商业主义文学”的转变。延至二十一世纪初,这批作家靠着昔日如日中天的知名度和在意识形态的高压与市场化的诱惑中磨砺出来的生存术,大都成为有限度的经济自由化政策的受益者,并为自己分到了一些残羹冷炙而洋洋自得。
在当年的那些小说家中,也有少数人介入散文随笔的写作,比如王蒙和余华。王蒙是看不起鲁迅的,他认为鲁迅太“偏激”,他洋洋洒洒地写了一大本所谓的“人生哲学”,其实是教导同胞们怎样才能把奴隶的位置做稳。王蒙自觉选择了“奴隶工头”的光荣角色。而余华在西方媒体上公然宣称,今天的中国早已实现了言论自由、写作自由和出版自由,因为他本人的作品从来就没有遭到过删节。其实,余华早已“挥刀自宫”了,哪里还需要中宣部检查官们的“大刀阔斧”呢?中国社会背景的变化,以及作家们无原则的退步和放弃,使得九十年代以来,文学逐渐退出中国社会文化的中心地位,作家也不再是舞台上的主角。普通百姓说起作家来,再没有八十年代的尊敬和赞美,许多作家日渐成为媒体的娱乐新闻上明星故事旁边的点缀。
而流亡海外的中国作家群体,情形也并不让人乐观。由于缺乏恒定的信仰与稳定的价值坚守,许多中国流亡作家没有能像俄罗斯、东欧的流亡作家们一样,继续保持旺盛的创作能力,继续对国族乃至整个人类的命运作出冷峻的思考。在西方,他们“得到了天空,失去了大地”,因为生活环境的变迁、语言的制约以及对异质文化缺乏理解与接纳的胸怀,许多流亡作家在怨天尤人之中丧失了创作的激情。
有意思的是,在流亡海外的小说家中,我注意到有两位自觉地完成了颇具象征意义的转变:郑义转向对中国环境问题的研究,以厚厚的一本中国环境问题报告警醒国人,勿将经济发展建立在对环境的掠夺性开发之上;孔捷生则转向杂文创作,以“易大旗”的笔名在新兴的网络载体上纵横驰骋,成为若干文化思想论战的积极参与者。在我看来,小说家转而写类似于梭罗的《瓦尔登湖》的美文易,而改行做严肃、枯燥、一板一眼的环境问题研究难,这正是郑义的可贵之处;小说家在闲暇时刻写点关于阿猫阿狗的“小男人小女人散文”易,而改行写富于思想锋芒和逻辑力量的杂文难,这正是孔捷生的可贵之处。小说家需要的是讲故事的能力和控制语言的天赋,而杂文家还需要社会学、历史学、法学、哲学、经济学等多方面的学识和见识。因此,从小说家到杂文家,需要在知识结构和思维方式等方面实现巨大的调整。可以说,由“孔捷生”到“易大旗”,由小说家到杂文家,他完成的是深渊前的纵身一跃。
易大旗的杂文,继承的是五四新文化运动以来鲁迅所秉持的国民性批判的传统。在二十世纪的中国文学史上,在小说创作和杂文创作两个方面都达到顶峰的作家,惟鲁迅一人而已。英国学者大卫-伊-波拉德在《鲁迅的杂文》中指出:“鲁迅的历史知识和他自己长期而苦涩的经历陶炼了他解释现象、从表面平常或孤立的事件中体察到重要性并把它们上升到关系民族状况的水平上来的能力。”(见《当代英语世界鲁迅研究》)显然,易大旗的杂文也有类似的特质,小说家的激情与社会学家的冷峻在其文字中得以融会贯通。
与某些流亡作家日益与中国国内的现实隔膜、最后走向“自言自语、自说自话”不同,易大旗的文章往往紧扣中国大陆“正在”发生的事件发言,诸如矿难、官吏腐败、上访潮、农民权利、司法不公、贫富悬殊等,诸如被中共设置为“禁区”的“六-四”、法轮功、台湾问题、西藏问题等,他均有若干鲜明的看法和独到的见解。近几年来,我在海外访问期间观察到了这样一种非常可悲的现象:许多已经在海外生活很久的作家,其潜意识里仍然“理所当然”地接受中共宣传部所设置的言论的禁区,他们的身体虽然生活在言论自由的西方世界,心灵却仍然被禁锢在密不透风的中国大陆。这是一种内化的审查机制,这是一种顽固的精神疾病,它缘于恐惧、缘于怯懦、缘于思维的惰性。易大旗则是其中少见的例外,他的文字真正做到了突破所有的禁区。同时,他的文字中也没有那种折射出内心怨毒的谩骂,而始终充满着理性的力量,这与他十多年来深入西方社会,真切体验西方民主自由的生活方式有关。
易大旗对中国传统文化持激烈的批判态度,他认为中国恶劣的现实情况是历史悠长的回声。这样一种思路贯穿在他的杂文当中:五四运动尚未真正结束,中国最需要的不是暴力革命,乃是思想启蒙。在五四运动被描述成“激进主义”,在鲁迅遭到贬斥,在启蒙遭到置疑的今天,易大旗的观点似乎显得有些不合时宜。相当大一部分对中国大陆现状持否定态度的民众、学者和信仰群体,普遍认为中共仅仅是一种外来“邪教”,只要将此种外来“邪教”清除出中国,并将中国传统文化复兴起来,中国就有救了。如法轮功修炼者群体、历史学家辛灏年、政治活动家袁红冰等均持有类似的看法。海外学者如林毓生和国内自由主义知识分子如朱学勤,也都置疑五四运动和启蒙主义的历史合理性。但是,与这些看法相比,我更同意易大旗在若干文章中所表达的观点:五四运动乃是中国现代文化、思想和精神的起点,五四运动乃是中国人认识自由、独立、平等、宽容等普世观念的起点,今天的中国需要的不是否定五四,而是重新进行国民性批判和文化启蒙。
中国传统文化的毒素至今仍然未能得到清理。仅仅批判共产党和共产主义意识形态,而忽略传统之毒,无法让中国进入文明社会,无法让中国人过上文明的生活。我们不能为了实现反对中共时的“快意恩仇”,而将中国的传统文化抽象出来、美化为一种顶礼膜拜的对象。因为中共不仅是一种外来之“邪教”这般简单,共产主义革命为何能够在中国和俄罗斯这样的国家之内取得胜利呢?因为这两个国家的专制主义传统最为深厚。中共能够以武力夺取大陆政权,能够在崛起之初获得大部分民众包括知识分子的支持,表明其意识形态深深根植于中国的文化传统之中 — 以毛泽东为例,毛根本没有读过几本马列书籍,他所喜好的乃是《二十四史》、《资治通鉴》、《三国演义》、《水浒传》、《红楼梦》等文史典籍,并俨然以秦始皇自居。在此意义上,毛乃是“传统中人”。李慎之曾经指出,中国的传统文化,一言以蔽之,乃是专制主义。今天的中国人并没有从专制主义的泥沼中解脱出来,却又在官方的主导下陷入了尊孔、兴儒学、祭黄帝陵等荒唐举动之中。因此,易大旗在文章中大声疾呼,鲁迅没有过时,今天的中国知识分子仍然需要举起反对专制主义和蒙昧主义的大旗。
易大旗以鲁迅为起点开始了他的杂文写作。这是一种反抗专制主义的写作,这是一种呼唤自由精神的写作,这是一种与五四精神对接的写作。我同意易大旗的观点,现在并非“复兴中国文化”的时候,而是“复兴五四精神”的时刻。我们的敌人仍然是专制主义 — 中国的历史与现实,渗透了专制主义的毒素;在我们每一个中国人的身体和精神里,也渗透着专制主义的毒素。任何讳疾忌医的作法都无助于问题的解决。易大旗 “刮骨疗伤”的姿态,使自己受到诸多的攻击和辱骂,其中不乏道德上的指责–“卖国贼”的大帽子满天飞舞,那些自以为“爱国”的人们根本不知道宽容为何物。历史学家徐复观曾经指出过:“古今中外,凡专以刑来实现道德,道德成为刑治的工具时,道德便变为刑的帮凶。”而正是专制主义成为中国文化的主流,使得思想自由和学术独立成为泡影,“因为专制政治,一切取决于皇帝的意志,便不能允许其他人有自由意志,不能有自律性的学术思想的发展。”(《两汉思想史》)从易大旗所遭致的攻击和谩骂上,我看到了中国专制主义传统的根深蒂固和启蒙事业的任重道远。只是,我们既然已经启程,便不会止步,如同鲁迅笔下的过客一样,我们将大步行走在光荣的荆棘路上。
二零零五年十一月十六日初稿
二零零七年一月二十一日改定
中国人现在出国的多了,国外关于中国游客的报道,也就相应多起来。记得是去年吧,《纽约时报》一篇发自泰国的通讯是这样开头的:这艘游船看上去与西方游客包的船一样,但你马上就知道它是不同的,船还没有出发,供游客在途中享用的食品已被哄抢一空——原来包船的是中国人。这本是你我熟知的国人见了免费食物的必然德性,但某些好同志如果不幸读到,肯定要挥拳愤怒高呼:“打倒美帝国主义!”“《纽约时报》造谣可耻!”“中国人民的感情被伤害了!”
确实,大陆中国人只要出国,感情几乎必然受伤害。被人讽刺行为不检点,那算小事;比较大的问题,还在于历史事件的记忆和理解。
网上曾经流行一篇文章,《我带领中国“公务团”遍寻红灯区》,说的不知是真事还是讽刺。作者自称是在欧洲专带中国团的导游。有一回,他带的公务团要找红灯区。略知英语的某团员问当地人,哪里有redhouse(英语“红房子”)。当地人见是中国人,就把他们指引到马克思故居。马克思的诞生地德国特里尔市,如今常有中国游客去参观。故居纪念馆现在由世界上第一个社会主义政党德国社会民主党管理。馆内有个“马克思在中国”专柜,陈列了一些国人见了失语的往事旧照。有些好同志向馆方提出要求:中国现在变化很大,用一些新照片来代替那些旧照片吧。女馆长却告诉记者:中国的官方历史,我是不承认的,我不需要中国人来告诉我如何展示历史。
这类文化冲撞,对我国形象在发达国家的下滑,大概也有所贡献。改革开放以来,我国形象在国际上总体上升。但今年的佩尤全球态度调查(PewGlobalAttitudesSurvey)发现,我国在非洲威望很高,在欧美有待重新崛起。就举德国为例子吧:德国受访者中,对中国有好感的比率,竟从去年的56%跌到今年的34%。
其实,同一段历史,两种叙述甚至多种解释,本是国际间普遍现象。中国和俄国对西伯利亚的易手叙述不同;中国和印度对1962年的边界战争叙述不同;中国和越南对1979年的边界战争叙述不同;中国和韩国对历史交往和朝鲜战争的叙述不同;倒还是中国和日本,对唐代以来的两国关系大致叙述相同。前年,中日韩三国学者合编的《东亚三国的近现代史》出版了。据《南方周末》(2005年6月2日)报道,中方参与者就说:“(与日本相比)倒是我们和韩国学者争论比较多。主要是甲午战争时期,中国出兵朝鲜半岛的性质问题。在韩国的教材里,甲午战争是中国军队出兵朝鲜,也被看做是‘侵略’。中方学者认为,当时的清政府与朝鲜是藩属关系,朝鲜向中国纳贡,不能等同于近代的侵略。”
我国学者非要跟韩国学者争论一百多年前的某事件是否“政治正确”,实在说来,有点思而不学,至少是不学国际学术常规。英语里有句话,Everyoneisentitledtohisownopinion.笔者中学时背《英语900句》,背到这一条,心里一高兴,原来每个人都有形成自己意见的权力,并不是非要官云亦云的。韩国学者可以有他们的不同意见,没必要强求一致。不过,那句900句之一,有时后面会接一个转折,Everyoneisentitledtohisownopinion,butnothisownfacts——你可以有自己的任何意见,但不能有“自己的”任何事实,事实必须是公认的。每个人都要尊重公认的事实,但允许对事实有不同理解和阐述。我国学者和韩国学者首先应该争论史料的真假,清查双方记录里的文过饰非。
曾有史家套用“英国和美国是被同一语言分开的两个民族”这句俏皮话,称英国和法国是被同一历史分开的两个民族。两国历史紧密纠缠,打过两场“百年战争”(1337-1453和1688-1815),还在欧洲的“三十年战争”(1618-1648)中分别加入敌对双方,年数短些的武装冲突则不计其数。两国对史实无异议,但英国人和法国人的历史记忆不同。比如,对第一场“百年战争”,英国人记得的是英军在阿艮格以劣势之旅大败法军。英王的战前动员,被莎士比亚在历史剧《亨利五世》中写成传世名言。但法国人记得的是他们在圣女贞德领导下,终于把英国人赶出法国。又如,对第二场“百年战争”,英国人更爱讲拿破仑在他们手里遭遇滑铁卢。法国人更爱讲的却是滑铁卢之役,法国将军康布罗纳对英军要求投降的回答,是暴喝一声“屎”!雨果就曾在小说《悲惨世界》中写道:滑铁卢的胜利者不是拿破仑,也不是英军统帅威灵顿,滑铁卢的胜利者是康布罗纳。雨果写下了法国人的传世名言。
各人记自己愿意记的,一点也不妨碍英法两国做生意,通文化,在两次世界大战中并肩作战,战后在国际事务上勾心斗角。
如果想不通这一条,非要否认事实或把自己的价值判断强加在别人头上呢?有位北京“十佳”中学生,父母担心他接触阴暗面,连中央电视台“焦点访谈”都不让看。他被美国名牌大学录取后,选修了几门与中国有关的课程。温室花朵料不到的是,每一门课里的叙述,都和他在中国学过的很不同。他到处找同学解释,表情严肃,话语滔滔,终于讲到人见人怕,见他就躲。该生渐渐陷入自闭状态,被迫休学一年。
非要把自己的想法强加于人,早晚搞到谁都不理你。
甚至强大如美国,照样逃不开这一教训。上月(6月)14日,美国三大外交老人,前总统尼克松的国家安全助理亨利。基辛格,前总统卡特的国家安全助理兹比格涅夫。布热津斯基,前总统老布什的国家安全助理布伦特。斯考克罗夫特,联袂出席一个电视讨论会。三人所属党派不同,很多问题上观点不同,但他们的看法有一点完全相同:这是一个变化中的世界,衡量国力的旧尺度不再适用,很多新的力量在觉醒,他们抱有一些不易满足的愿望,美国必须尊重他们的愿望并倾听其他国家的呼声。老人的共同建议似乎有效,两星期后,布什总统宣布,美国将向有着五十七个国家成员的伊斯兰会议组织派遣一位特使,布什说特使的任务首先是倾听和学习。
有趣的是,三位外交老人并没有呼吁其他国家尊重美国人民的感情。这倒也是美国人的习惯,或许来自他们的宗教传统——基督教强调主动救济病人和弱者,这在心理上就自然而然地将教徒置于弱者对面的人间位置。再配以国力强大,这种心态未受过严重挫折,几代人下来,就成了美国民族特色。
很受美国人尊敬的前总统肯尼迪,当年带着战后新生代的希望走上历史舞台,他在就职演说中,定义了他的理想世界:Anewworldoflaw——wherethestrongarejust,andtheweaksecure,andthepeacepreserved.在肯尼迪看来,对强者和弱者的要求是不一样的。强者公正,弱者感到安全,这样和平才能长久。肯尼迪当然认为美国是强者,且不论美国政府是否做得到强者公正,他的话本身并不错。其实,论绝对国力,中国已经是强者,处事不妨有风度一些,何必总是摆出一副感情被伤害的样子?我们对历史有自己的看法,但也理解韩国学者的立场,这样韩国人才会在心理上感到安全,两国和两国人民就可以建立更和谐的关系。
至于韩国教材说清廷甲午出兵是侵略,这种话,听听也无妨。以笔者在中小学受的教育,本人一直以为,世界各民族就数中国人最善良,最爱和平,只做受气包,不做侵略者。西部骑马来的吐蕃打过了,又被北方骑马来的蒙古人打,南面海上来的欧洲人打过了,又被东边海上来的日本人打。还是读了《南方周末》那篇报道,才知道阿Q原来讲得对:“我们先前——比你阔多啦。”那位北京“十佳”少年,早知祖先在他人眼里也有这一阔,或许就不会休学了。
在一个缺乏价值判断的年代,唯有文化才是解决混乱与迷茫的有效手段。
文化能做什么?诗人马修·阿诺德(Matthew Arnold)在一八六零年代试图在英国讨论这一问题时,文化似乎正陷入一个真正可悲的境地。在出版于一八六九年一月的《文化与无政府状态》序言中,四十六岁的阿诺德引用了当时最为流行的论调:“那些奢谈‘文化’的人,无非是一知半解地摆弄希腊、拉丁那两门死语言而已”,“当下最愚蠢的高谈阔论莫过于满口文化了……,要论掉书袋、缺心眼、少理智,没人能比得过文化人”。
这是维多利亚时代的英国,帝国不仅拥有世界上最强大的武装,它还是当之无愧的世界工厂,生产著全球一半以上的钢铁与纺织品,伦敦是国际商业与金融的中心;这也是一个民主兴起与物质至上主义兴起的年代。新兴的中产阶级则纷纷陷入了典型的物质崇拜症中,这种精神直到一九零九年仍让H·G·韦尔斯惊奇不已:“作为这个阶级,他们谈的、想的和梦的都是财富”。
马修·阿诺德发现这是一个真正的历史性时刻,贵族们充满傲慢,鄙薄大众文化的兴起,虽然在他们身上存续著很多杰出的传统,却常常沉溺于形式主义当中;中产阶级常常被报刊称作国家的支柱,却往往阴郁沉闷、眼界狭隘,“相信日子富得流油便是伟大的幸福”;而刚刚获得政治地位的劳动阶层,仍然被贫困与无知困扰著,在十九世纪后半叶的欧洲,他们是危险、不安与盲动的代名词。
阿诺德给这三个阶级分别命名“野蛮人”、“菲利士人”与“群氓”,它们力量的此消彼长,使传统的社会组织陷入瓦解,混乱与迷惘接踵而至。马修·阿诺德相信,唯有文化才是解决这种混乱的有效手段。阿诺德心目中的文化,不是僵化的精英文化传统,更绝非仅仅满口拉丁文,它是从属于任何阶级的任何个体自我修养的需要。在一个价值失衡的年代,阿诺德渴望文化取代日渐衰落的宗教与哲学的作用,以至于他会称“我们目前视为宗教和哲学的绝大部分东西将被诗歌取代”。对各种事物的好奇心,对于希腊精神中所推崇的“美好的与光明的两种事物”的追求,是阿诺德心目中文化的真正要义,它既来自于希腊以来的伟大传统,与摆脱时代局限的经典,也来自于其他国家的文化成就。阿诺德本人既钟情于荷马与索福克斯勒,也欣然接受了海涅与托尔斯泰。他渴望人人都是文化的信仰者,每个人力图使自己变得更聪明、更有教养,是和平世界的更有力的保障。
他确信知识分子应该在价值混乱的社会生活中扮演的中心角色。他从未将自己局限于专业的诗歌或是文学批评领域,而是将智力勇敢地运用到公共生活中的每一部分,穿越于诗歌、批评、期刊杂志和社会评论之间……,拒绝被绑缚在单一的话语领域内,寻求使思想对整个社会生活产生影响。
一百五十年前的马修·阿诺德能为今天的中国提供某种示吗?尽管我们并非文化决定论者,却像阿诺德一样相信,文化可以在一个缺乏价值判断的年代提供一个强有力的参照。在很多时刻,阅读他的《文化与无政府状态》似乎就是阅读今日的中国,只不过那些“钢铁与煤是国脉所系”,演变成“GDP增长是国脉所系”。在过去的半个世纪里,幸福生活的标志从“楼上楼下,电灯电话”,发展到“有房有车”,我们所追求的小康社会的标志,竟然是以“是否拥有第二套住房”来衡量。越来越多的人将中国视作重新崛起的大国,不过外来的观察者,仍将中国视作某种层面上的“经济动物”。我们仍未学会,如何将物质力量转化为精神的力量。同时,在中国社会内部,我们更常常被眼前的混乱不堪所迷惑,那些古老的、陈腐的观念竟然又变成了社会的主流,公众的迷惘情绪也令人惊讶。我们当真生活在阿诺德所说的“群氓时代”,而我们新兴的中产阶级在尚未表现出朝气与活力之前,就已经准备一头扎入物质主义与狭隘眼界的怀抱,他们或许渴望新的观念与权力,却不知道如何提高自我和如何表达。
我们知道文化是一种必须被引入的社会判断标准,却被这个词语蕴涵的过分宽阔的理念弄得不知所措。“希腊化”适合于阿诺德时代的英国,却不是我们的解决之道。我们要从被迫断裂的自己的传统中寻找精神资源,同时也必须借助更为广阔与久远的世界文明的传统,它们之间似乎总是蕴涵著冲突,但正是这种张力提供了创造力的源泉。
但首先,我们要修正对于一个好社会的看法,它不是高楼大厦、经济成就,而是阿诺德所说的“当一个国家出现全民性的生活和思想的闪光时,当整个社会充分浸润在思想之中,具有感受美的能力,聪明指挥,富有活力——这便是人类最幸运的时刻。”今日的中国不正在等待这个时刻的到来吗?
■ 许知远,二零零零年毕业于北京大学,现为《生活》杂志的联合出版人,也是《金融时报》中文网的专栏作家。他最近的一本书是《那些忧伤的年轻人》
当某个国家行政机关发现了自己管辖范围内的违法行为,当然有义务严格地执行法律,对于违法行为作出处罚。不过,最近我们看到了一起蹊跷的事情。国家新闻出版总署明确地认为一些书的出版存在着”违规”的事实,但是该署却没有对于相关作品加以查禁。下面是《侨报》2月1日的一篇报道片段:
就近日网上流传”总署查禁8本书”的消息,中国国家新闻出版总署图书司负责人在接受媒体访问时表示:”不存在查禁的问题,这次我们一本书都没有查禁。”
据《联合早报》报道,该负责人向该报表示,总署确实在1月11日于北京大兴区举行过一次内部工作会议,在会议上有9家出版社被批评。9家出版社涉及的问题包括买卖书号等。该负责人说,没有所谓”8本禁书”的事情,但是确有5本书在会上被点名批评,包括《一个普通中国人的家族史》,因为有读者投诉该书美化了侵华日军。湖南文艺出版社因出版《伶人往事》,在这次会议上也受到了批评。
该负责人转述新闻出版总署副署长邬书林在内部会议上的发言说:”作者怎么写、写什么,这属于作者的创作自由。我们不搞因书废人,或者是因人废书;但是出版社应该遵守国家关于出版的法令规定。”
另外,据台湾《中国时报》2月8日报道,”……新闻出版总署副署长、国家版权局副局长阎晓宏今天在国务院新闻办举行的记者会上也否认当局近期查禁八本书。不过,阎晓宏表示,他们的确有按法例查处八本书,原因是当中部分涉及色情,部分会引起民族及宗教问题,部分涉及国家安全秘密,但最终并无查禁,仍然可以在书店买到。”
情况很清楚,就是总署对于”美化侵华日军”以及”部分涉及色情、部分会引起民族及宗教问题,部分涉及国家安全秘密”的八本书仅仅查处,但非查禁,任由其在书店里销售。而且,总署的行为对于这八本书的销售起到了广告作用,近来在不少书店里,这些书大多进入了畅销书排行榜。
查处而非查禁,看来政府部门对于这些书籍的态度足够宽容。然而,这样做却明显地有”行政不作为”的嫌疑。问题的要害在于那些书是否构成总署所指控的”罪名”。如果构成,则必须查禁书籍,而不能任由流通,危害社会。如果没有构成,则任何对于出版社的处罚都是不正当的。当查禁不查禁,则属玩忽职守,放纵恶行;不当查处却查处,则是政府越权,滥杀无辜。
所以,新闻出版总署眼下必须做的事情是:具体地公布这些书究竟哪些地方美化日军,哪些地方会引起民族及宗教问题,涉嫌国家安全秘密的是哪一类国家安全秘密。在此前提下,刻不容缓的是,必须马上对于这些有害书籍加以查禁,对出版社同时也对于作者进行处罚。
末了,我对于新闻出版总署以及其他一些机构在新闻出版管理方面神秘兮兮的做派也颇感不满。书籍违规,处罚出版社,不发书面文件,偷偷摸摸的,好像是在干见不得人的事情。当事情闹大,总署要对于有关问题作出说明,但是奇怪的是,却是透过新加坡的《联合早报》进行所谓”权威澄清”,你处罚的出版社、涉及到的利害关系人都在国内,你不通过《人民日报》、《光明日报》这样的国内媒体说明,却不远万里跑到新加坡在一家资产阶级的报纸上搞什么权威澄清,这算是哪门子事情!